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Precertification Settlement of Class
Actions: Will California Follow the
Federal Lead?
by
J. SPENCER SCHUSTER*

The captioned parties to proposed class action lawsuits often find it
mutually advantageous to settle their individual claims long before a trial
on the merits is ever contemplated seriously.' The expense of notifying
absent class members of a proposed settlement and the cumbersome procedures that accompany the dismissal of a certified class action suit encourage class action attorneys to negotiate settlements of the named
plaintiffs' individual claims prior to judicial recognition of the class. The
state and federal courts that have monitored this circumvention of the
conventional certification process have done so in a vast procedural vacuum. Unfortunately, the solutions devised by these courts often have
exacerbated existing problems.
The allure of these precertification settlements 2 is not difficult to
conceptualize: a defendant, believing that the plaintiffs initiating the suit
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1986; Member, Third Year Class.
1. "[I]n practice, few class actions are fully litigated. Most class actions for damages are
either dismissed before trial or settled." Developments in the Law: ClassActions, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1318, 1373 (1976) [hereinafter HarvardStudy].
One empirical study of class and derivative actions brought against the 190 largest publicly held corporations, as determined by Fortunemagazine's 1975 survey, concluded that 71%
of all suits filed were settled before reaching a trial on the merits. An additional 17% were
dismissed, and 4% were denied class status. According to the study, only a paltry 4% of all
class actions and shareholder derivative suits filed were litigated fully. Jones, An Empirical
Examination of the Resolution of ShareholderDerivativeand ClassAction Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L.
RFV. 542, 544-47 (1980).
An earlier study of class actions filed in the federal courts in the District of Columbia
revealed that 63% of the cases were settled or dismissed prior to the certification decision. Of
those cases that proceeded beyond the certification stage, 55% were disposed of on preliminary
motions in favor of the defendant. See Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical
Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1135-38 (1974) (authored by Bruce I. Burtelson, Mary S. Calfee,
and Gerald W. Connor).
2. In this Note, the term "precertification settlement" refers only to settlements or compromises of the claims of individual members of the alleged class negotiated prior to certification. Such settlements typically involve only the captioned parties and are without prejudice
to the absent putative class members.
The term is not used to refer to "class-wide settlements," the purpose of which is to bind
[863]
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are likely to be the only potential claimants, may be willing to settle with
even absent class plaintiffs to the terms of the settlement agreement. For a valid class-wide
settlement, the class must be certified in connection with the settlement. In the typical
scenario,
[t]he parties simply agree on what the class is. The defendant agrees not to challenge
certification if the judge approves the settlement. The members of the temporary
class are simultaneously notified of the pending suit, the class certification, and the
settlement. All loose ends are tied up. Everything is approved, and everyone lives
happily ever after.
Kempf & Taylor, Settling Class Actions, 13 LITIGATION 26, 29 (Fall 1986); see also AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS', RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES AFFECTING COM-

LITIGATION 32-34 (Feb. 27, 1981) (suggesting that "tentative settlement classes" are a
valuable "device for avoiding the waste of judicial resources") [hereinafter TRIAL LAWYERS
RECOMMENDATIONS]. If the settlement fails for any reason, the defendant will have reserved
PLEX

the right to withdraw the stipulation conceding the existence of the class and object to class
certification de novo. See 2 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.22, at 418 (2d

ed. 1985).
These "tentative settlement classes," which are designed to ensure that the settlement
receives the broadest possible res judicata effect, have provoked a considerable amount of con-

troversy. Compare MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 63 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter MANUAL] (suggesting that tentative settlement classes "should ordinarily not be
formed") with NEWBERG, supra, § 11.27, at 425-32 (finding the Manual's position "questionable" and advocating the creation of temporary settlement classes as a means of resolving major

class action disputes) and TRIAL

LAWYERS RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra, at 33 ("Ultimately,

the Manual ignores both the considerable value to the system of settling large class actions and

the importance of settlement classes as a means of encouraging settlement."). The new Manual is somewhat more restrained, suggesting that the courts should be "wary" and use "great
caution" when certifying a class for purposes of settlement only. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX

§ 30.45, at 243 (1986) [hereinafter MANUAL (SECOND)].
Despite legitimate concerns about the possible circumvention of rule 23 safeguards, the

LITIGATION, SECOND

use of these tentative settlement classes in federal courts is firmly established. See, e.g., Wein-

berger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) (court permitted creation of temporary settlement class but subjected the settlement's fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy to heightened
scrutiny), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167,
174 (5th Cir. 1979) (temporary settlement classes favored "when there is little or no likelihood
of abuse, and the settlement is fair and reasonable and under the scrutiny of the trial judge"),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475, 478-79

(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (tentative class certification approved for settlement purposes only); In re
Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1388-90 (D. Md. 1983) (creation of
temporary settlement class approved); accord Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 606, 612
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690, 693-94 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(observing that "the formation of tentative settlement classes is a recognized and useful tool for
the amicable disposition of sometimes otherwise unmanageable class suits," but refusing to
permit the establishment of such a class on the facts before it); Alaniz v. California Processors,
Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269, 277-78 (N.D. Cal.) (acknowledged the need for extracare when confronted with tentative settlement classes but approved the use of a tentative settlement class
when the plaintiff lost no leverage, there was added protection against a sell out, and the
adequacy of representation was well litigated and closely-scrutinized), modified, 73 F.R.D. 289
(N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (approving proposed compromise settlement and dismissing with prejudice all claims of the classes), aff'd, 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1972). But see In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine
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the named plaintiffs alone even though such a settlement affords less protection than a binding class-wide settlement. Other considerations, ranging from the legitimate to the duplicitous, also may set the settlement
machinery in motion.
From a defendant's standpoint, concerns about the adverse publicity
often generated by the filing of a class action lawsuit and the potential for
vast exposure to damages militate strongly-and, indeed, legitimatelyin favor of early settlement.3 Likewise, from the named plaintiff's perspective, an earnest desire to obtain an adequate, speedy, and cost-efficient settlement would seem legitimate. It is no secret, however, that
4
class actions often are instituted against carefully selected defendants
solely to obtain lucrative cash settlements 5 for the named plaintiffs and
fees for their attorneys. 6 Alternatively, a defendant may be tempted to
Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1129 n.38 (7th Cir.) (adverting to the "inadvisability of
creating tentative subclasses for settlement purposes without careful examination of the adequacy of the representation of each subclass") (emphasis in original), cerL denied,444 U.S. 870
(1979); McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The
suggestion of the [Manual] that there should be a class action determination before any settlement negotiations occur wisely provides for the majority of cases."); Lyon v. Arizona, 80
F.R.D. 665, 669 (D. Ariz. 1978) (holding that plaintiffs' negotiation of settlement, without
seeking damages for the unnamed plaintiffs who would be bound by principles of res judicata
in the event that the tentative class was certified, rendered them inadequate representatives of
the class); Smith v. Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D. 154, 169 (D. Kan. 1978) (same),
aff'd, 624 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1980); Arellano v. Arizona, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1392, 1393 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 1977) (same).
While an extended discussion of class-wide settlement devices is outside the scope of this
Note, this author suggests that the use of tentative settlement classes is consistent with the
functional approach to precertification settlement issues advocated herein. At the very least,
"some of the money that might otherwise be spent on certification trench warfare can be used
to fund a litigation peace treaty." Kempf & Taylor, supra, at 29.
3. See generally 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 11.04, at 401-02 (Positive Factors
Affecting Settlement Possibilities).
4. Except where otherwise noted, this Note does not address defendant class action
suits. Though both federal and California procedural schemes authorize actions againsta class
of defendants, the defendant class action poses a unique set of problems best treated independently. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973) (providing that "one or more may sue
or defend for the benefit of all") (emphasis added); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) ("One or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all... ") (empha-

sis added). For an expanded discussion of lawsuits brought against a class of defendants, see 1
H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, §§ 4.45-4.70, at 372-421.
5. See Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the PrecertificationStage: Is Notice
Required?, 56 N.C.L. 1Ev. 303, 304 (1978). As Almond points out, such "strike suits," which
are conjured up solely to coerce defendants into settlement negotiations, have been criticized
roundly by judges and commentators, and have been described variously as "Frankenstein
monsters," Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting), "legalized blackmail," Handler, The Shift From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits--The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. 1Ev. 1, 9
(1971), and "engine[s] of destruction," Simon, Class Actions--Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 375 (1972).
6. "The large fees that class actions can generate may create a conflict of interest be-

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

"buy off" a representative plaintiff who is willing to sell, for nuisance
value, whatever interest the putative class members may have in the
maintenance of the suit. 7
There are two competing policy concerns underlying the precertification settlement process. The public policy of encouraging settlement
lies at one end of the spectrum . At the other end is the protection of the
rights of absent class members-a consideration with apparent constitutional ramifications. 9 The procedural apparatus that governs the class
action device represents an attempt to balance these competing interests.
In the federal courts, class action procedure is governed by rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 The federal rules contemplate
certification of the class first, I I followed by notice to members of the
tween the attorney and the named plaintiffs and can provide an incentive to abuse the class
action process by bringing suits of questionable legal merit." Harvard Study, supra note 1, at
1581-82; see also Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 686 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (expressing concern that "plaintiffs' attorney may accept an insufficient judgment for the class in trade
for immediate and certain compensation for himself in the form of legal fees ....
), aff'd, 577
F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978).

7.

See

TRIAL LAWYERS' RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note 2, at 32. One practitioner

has noted that "a defendant may be tempted to bribe the plaintiff, particularly where his individual claim is modest compared to the defendant's exposure." FyIstra, Settlement of Class
Action Cases Priorto Class Certification, 69 ILL. B.J. 24, 24 (1980). It likewise has been suggested that "[t]he sheer magnitude of class action litigation and the expense and complexity of
defending class claims often convince these defendants that a one-sided, undeserved cash settlement is preferable to whatever Pyrrhic victory might be won after months, if not years, of
protracted litigation on the merits." Almond, supra note 5, at 304.
8. "[T]here is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation. This is
particularly true in class action suits which are now an ever increasing burden to so many
federal courts and which frequently present serious problems of management and expense."
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted); Magana
v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see also Pearson v. Ecological
Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e are guided throughout our decision by
the principle that '[s]ettlement agreements are highly favored in the law and will be upheld
whenever possible because they are a means of amicably resolving doubts and preventing lawsuits.' ") (quoting D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1971)), cert.
denied sub nom. Skydell v. Ecological Science Corp., 425 U.S. 912 (1976); Stull v. Baker, 410
F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("The courts, as well as the law, favor the compromise of
disputed claims.").
9. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (in order to
bind absent but known class plaintiffs to judgments for money damages or similar relief, a state
must provide "minimal procedural due process protection," that is, the plaintiff must receive
notice reasonably calculated to succeed and an opportunity to remove himself from the class
by executing and returning an "opt out" form). See generally Comment, Phillips Petroleum
Company v. Shutts, ProceduralDue Process, and Absent Class Plaintiffs: Minimum Contacts is
Out-Is Individual Notice In?, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 817, 830-36 (1986) (authored by
Bob Wenbourne) (examining the Schutts "minimal procedural due process protection"
standard).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
11. Federal rule 23(c)(1) provides in part that "[a]s soon as practicable after the com-
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class, alerting them to the pendency of the litigation. 12 If a settlement or
compromise of the action is proposed thereafter, rule 23(e) requires the
court to apprise the class of the terms of the proposed settlement' 3 and of
4
the options available to the class members.'
The federal rules do not address specifically the situation in which
the named parties in a purported class action reach a settlement agreement prior to the certification decision. As a result, the federal courts
remain sharply divided on the applicability of the notice and court approval requirements of rule 23(e) at the precertification stage.' 5
mencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether
it is to be so maintained." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1).
12. Federal rule 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the
class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
Of course, the notice requirements of rule 23(c)(2) are limited expressly to class actions
maintained under rule 23(b)(3) that involve common questions of law and fact. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175, 177 n.14 (1974) (rule 23(c)(2) requires that individual
notice be sent to all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort in class actions
brought under rule 23(b)(3), but declining to address whether such notice is required in actions
brought under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) of rule 23); see also 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2,
§ 8.05, at 98-100 (discussing the notice implications of 23(b)(3) certification); Manual of Class
Action Notice Forms, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. ANTrrRusT at 4-11 (same) [hereinafter Notice Forms].
If certified as either a 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class action, notification of class certification is
not mandated by rule 23(c)(2), but the federal courts have split on whether due process requires some sort of notice. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 508 F.2d 239, 256-57 (3d Cir.
1975) (due process did not require individual notice to class members in a Title VII employment discrimination class action certified pursuant to rule 23(b)(2)), cert denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1982); accord Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1184-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(23(b)(1) class action), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); American Fin. Sys. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D.
94, 110-11 (D. Md. 1974) (23(b)(2) class action); Badgett v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 173, 174-75 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (23(b)(2) class action). But
see Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 436-37 (5th Cir. 1979) (due process requires that notice be sent to absent class members in a 23(b)(2) action before their individual
monetary claims can be barred by res judicata); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D.
495, 499 (E.D. Va. 1975) (individual notice required in 23(b)(2) class action); Kolta v. Tuck
Indus., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1049, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
13. See infra text accompanying note 26. Such notice is required regardless of whether
the action has been certified under rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).
14. Generally speaking, the absent class members must be given an opportunity to object
to the terms of the proposed settlement. If the settlement subsequently is approved, the objectors may be permitted to assume the role of class representatives for purposes of appealing
from the final judgment approving the settlement. Notice Forms, supra -note 12, at 11.
15. See infra notes 30-160 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested that
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California has no analogue to federal rule 23. A broad provision in
the California Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the use of the class
action device. 16 In addition, the courts may find statutory authorization
in the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Act),1 7 which was promulgated in
1970. The Act allows a consumer who suffers any damage resulting from
a "method, act, or practice" made unlawful by the Act to bring a class
18
action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers.
The procedural prerequisites to bringing a consumer class action under
the Act are similar to those set forth in federal rule 23(a),1 9 and the Caliprovisions of
fornia courts, on occasion, have looked to the procedural
20
the Act even in actions outside the consumer context.
the federal authorities can be grouped into four categories, each espousing a fundamentally
different theory with regard to the applicability of rule 23(e) in the precertification setting:
1) rule 23(e) should be strictly applied to dismissals and settlements of uncertified
class actions; 2) rule 23(e) should be applied to such settlements and dismissals but

notice of the suit's termination need not be sent to all putative class members; 3) rule
23(e) is not applicable at all to dismissals and settlements of uncertified class actions;
and 4) rule 23(e) should be applied according to the so-called functional approach
under which a flexible case-by-case analysis is utilized.
Comment, The Applicability of Rule 23(e) to PrecertificationProceedings: The FunctionalApproach Applied, 25 VILL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1980) (authored by Kevin Silverang) (footnotes
omitted). See generally Annotation, Notice of ProposedDismissalor Compromise of Class Action to Absent Putative Class Members in Uncertified Class Action Under Rule 23(e) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 A.L.R. FED. 290 (1984 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Propriety of
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal or Compromise of Class Action, Pursuantto Rule 23(e) of the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 52 A.L.R. FED. 457 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973) provides that "when the question is one of
a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all."
The California provision duplicates that of New York's Field Code, adopted in 1849. See
N. Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 7B (McKinney 1963) (superseded). New York has since abandoned
this approach in favor of a series of statutes modeled after FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 901-909 (McKinney 1976). Several states, however, retain similar provisions.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.08 (West 1977).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985).
18. See id. §§ 1780(a), 1781(a).
19. Federal rule 23(a) provides:
[O]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if(l) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
FED. R. CIv. P 23(a); cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b)(l)-(4)(West 1985), which sets forth the
procedural prerequisites to treatment as a consumer class action.
20. See McGee v. Bank of Am., 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 447, 131 Cal. Rptr. 482, 484-85
(1976) ("Once a cognizable class has been established, the criteria and procedure to be used in
determining whether a class action shall be maintained are set forth in Civil Code section 1781,
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When California authority is lacking, the California Supreme Court
has instructed the lower courts to look to the class action procedures of
22
federal rule 23.21 The California courts are not bound by federal law,
however, and should apply rule 23 only to the extent that2it3 is consistent
with the policies underlying the state class action device.
supplemented by reference to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Cartt v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 965, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (1975) (same).
21. See San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447,453, 525 P.2d 701, 705, 115 Cal. Rptr.
797, 801 (1974) ("This court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative, encouraging
them to incorporate procedures from outside sources in determining whether to allow the
maintenance of a particular class suit. More specifically, we have directed them to rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... "); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d
864, 872, 489 P.2d 1113, 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1971) ("Although no California statute
or decision governs dismissal of class actions generally, we have previously suggested that trial
courts, in the absence of controlling California authority, utilize the class action procedures of
the federal rules."); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 809 (1971) ("In the event of a hiatus, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes procedural devices which a trial court may find useful."); accord Schneider v.
Vennard, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1340, 1345, 228 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1986), rev. denied, (Nov. 26,
1986); Bangert v. Narmco Materials Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 207, 211, 209 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440
(1984).
The California courts also have utilized the tripartite analysis of rule 23(b) to decide
whether notice to class members of the pendency of the action is required. See Frazier v. City
of Richmond, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1491, 228 Cal. Rptr. 376, 1381-84 (1986) (finding that the
action should be treated as a 23(b)(2) class action, thus obviating the need for individual notice), rev. denied, (Oct. 16, 1986); Miller v. Woods, 148 Cal. App. 3d 862, 196 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1983) (same); Lowry v. Obledo, Ill Cal. App. 3d 14, 23, 169 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736 (1980)
(same).
In addition to the established practice of looking to federal law for guidance, at least one
superior court has adopted its own local rules for the conduct of class actions. See Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPER. CT.CLASS AcTION MANUAL, rules 401-470 (1982) [hereinafter SUPERIOR COURT RULES]. These rules are patterned primarily after federal rule 23, and provide
for court approval of settlements and dismissals, subject to the caveat that "[a] settlement will
not ordinarily be approved if as a result thereof the class representative will receive some
benefit not made available to the other members of the class." Id rule 461; see infra notes 20002 and accompanying text.
22. For instance, in Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376
(1975), the court noted that
Rule 23, as such, does not bind California courts. While our Supreme Court has,
repeatedly referred to Rule 23 as a useful tool.., it has never adopted it as a procedural strait jacket. To the contrary, trial courts ha[ve] been urged to exercise pragmatism and flexibility in dealing with class actions.
Id.at 970 n.16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.16; (citations omitted) accord Southern Cal. Edison Co.
v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 832, 839, 500 P.2d 621, 625, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1972);
Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 283, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584
(1976).
23. On occasion, the California courts have expressed differences of opinion with their
brethren on the federal courts about the policies that underlie the class action device. See, eg.,
Cart, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 970 n.17 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.17 (Presiding Judge Kaus noted that
"(t]he apparent federal distaste for consumer class actions is not reflected in California."); see
also McGhee v. Bank of Am., 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 451, 131 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1976)
(alluding to the federal policy that prohibits "dual representation" of a class by attorneys who

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

The California courts have not articulated cogently the procedures
that trial courts should employ when the captioned parties seek to settle
or dismiss a proposed class action suit. Consequently, this Note addresses the extent to which a California court, presented with a precertification settlement proposal, should apply the basic procedural safeguards
of court approval and notice embodied in rule 23(e).
Section I discusses the approach the federal courts have taken in
addressing the precertification settlement issue. This section examines
several of the early federal cases in which the courts imposed a
mandatory notice requirement, even when the named parties sought to
compromise only their individual claims. The section concludes that a
"functional approach" to rule 23(e), in which notification of the proposed settlement is discretionary with the court, best serves the policies
underlying the rule.
The Note then examines the California approach to precertification
issues. Section II discusses several California cases in which the parties
initiating class action lawsuits have obtained satisfaction of their individ24
ual claims prior to a judicial determination of the viability of the class.
This section focuses on the judiciary's perceived need to control the settlement process. In Section III, the Note sketches a proposal for California courts faced with the task of assessing the fairness of proposed
settlements in nascent class action suits. Finally, the Note concludes by
suggesting that, in the absence of statutory clarification, a flexible approach to precertification issues would best serve the interests of the parties, the putative class, and the California courts.
I.

The Federal Approach to Precertification Settlements

The purpose of this Note is to anticipate California's treatment of
the precertification settlement problem. Because the federal courts have
reached widely divergent results due to subtle procedural and factual
variations, the temptation to generalize California's probable treatment
of the problem by engaging in judicial "head counting" must be resisted
as both artificial and misleading. Most of the cases are essentially resultoriented, and are best categorized not by circuit or judicial district but
according to their outcomes. Only by identifying the strengths and
also serve as class representatives, but noting that "in California such dual representation,
subject to the discretionary authority of the court to prevent overreaching, has been implicitly
).
sanctioned ....
24. Satisfaction of the named plaintiff's claim may be obtained by a consensual agreement between the parties, or may result from a defendant's unilateral grant of benefits to the
named plaintiffs. The California courts have taken an especially dim view of the latter practice, preventing dismissal of the claim without notice to the class. See La Sala v. American
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal.3d 864, 868, 489 P.2d 1113, 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (1971)

(defendant's unilateral grant of benefits to named plaintiffs did not render them unfit to continue to represent the class).
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weaknesses of the various approaches can California hope to construct a
useful procedural framework and avoid the unevenness that has plagued
the federal courts.
A.

Rule 23(e)

The United States Supreme Court promulgated rule 23(e) in 1966.25
In its present form, the rule provides that "[a] class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court directs. ' 26 The purpose of the rule
is to curb abuse of the class action device by ensuring that nonparty class
27
members are apprised of settlements potentially affecting their rights.
In particular, the rule seeks to discourage the captioned parties from colluding and selling out the interests of the class members. 2 8 The major
concern is that these unnamed parties may have relied on the suit for

vindication of their rights, and
therefore may have refrained from com29
mencing their own lawsuits.
Because these same concerns are present at the precertification
stage, 30 many courts have reasoned that rule 23(e) applies to purported
class action lawsuits regardless of whether the class has been certified
formally at the time the settlement is proposed. 3 1 Courts adhering to this
25. 28 U.S.C. (1966) app. at 2019 (amendment to rule 23).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
27. See 7B C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797, at
340 (1986).
28. See 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 11.63, at 502.
29. See HarvardStudy, supra note 1, at 1540 ("Class members with individually recoverable claims may have relied upon informal publicity about the existence of the class suit and
abstained from filing individual or class claims.").
30. "Rule 23 abuse is at its height during the pre-certification stage when defendant is
literally threatened by potential class-wide liability. Because the existence of a class has not
been determined, the likelihood increases that plaintiff and his counsel will unduly sacrifice the
previously-asserted class interest for private gain." Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74
F.R.D. 61, 66-67 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Renfrew, Negotiation andJudicialScrutiny of Settlements
in Civil and CriminalAntitrust Cases, 70 F.R.D. 495, 500-01 (1976) ("The potential for abuse
is greatest when a settlement or other disposition is suggested either before discovery or before
certification of the class.") (authored by Judge Renfrew of the Northern District of California).
31. See eg., Philadelphia Elec. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), in which the court held that
whatever uncertainties exist as to the precise status of an action brought as a class
action, during the interim between filing and the 23(c)(1) determination by the court,
it must be assumed to be a class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise
under 23(e) unless and until a contrary determination is made under 23(c)(1).
For discussion of PhiladelphiaEle., see infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
The weight of authority would appear to favor this early presumption of class viability.
See, eg., City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
that a purported class action must be assumed to be a class action until the court has reached a
contrary determination); Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
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rather expansive view of rule 23(e) generally require not only that the
court approve the settlement, but also that notice of the proposed settlement be sent to members of the putative class. 32 Because of the expense
of complying with the notice requirement, the benefits of early settlement
are diminished significantly in these jurisdictions that presume the viabil33
ity of the class and require such notice prior to certification.
Several courts-perhaps recognizing that class allegations often are
manufactured solely to enhance the named plaintiff's bargaining leverage 34 -have taken the view that rule 23(e), by its express terms, is not
applicable to precertification settlements that extinguish only the individual claims of certain class members. 35 To the extent that the court approval requirement is foreclosed by outright rejection of rule 23(e), these
cases may go too far. 36
398 U.S. 950 (1970); see also Smith v. Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D. 154, 168 (D.
Kan. 1978) ("[p]ending certification class status must be presumed"), aff'd, 624 F.2d 125
(10th Cir. 1980); Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, 75 F.R.D. 26, 30 (D. Haw. 1977) ("Where the
question of notice under Rule 23(e) has been presented prior to a determination on the validity
of the class action, courts have presumed the viability of the class action."); Burgener v. California Adult Auth., 407 F. Supp. 555, 560 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (after filing, and before class
determination, "action must be presumed to be proper for purposes of dismissal or settlement
and therefore Rule 23(e) applies"); In re Air West Sec. Litig., 73 F.R.D. 12, 13-14 (N.D. Cal.)
(the suit should be treated as a properly constituted class action during the period between the
filing of the suit and the ruling on the motion to certify), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1976);
Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (same); Johnson v. Wentz
Equip. Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499, 1501 (D. Kan. Dec. 22, 1977) (same).
32. See infra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
33. Referring to the potentially onerous cost of notifying putative class members of settlements that do not purport to compromise their rights, one commentator has posited that "[a]n
individual settlement at the precertification stage that must be communicated to an unknown
number of unnamed potential plaintiffs is, from the defendant's perspective, worse than no
settlement at all." Almond, supra note 5, at 314. Likewise, it has been suggested that the
"notice requirement can only have the effect of inhibiting the settlement of suits." Comment,
supra note 15, at 502.
34. [T]he major threat posed by the settlement of the named plaintiff's claim prior
to class certification is that the named plaintiff and his counsel will have used the
assertion of a class to increase their personal bargaining leverage and extract from
the defendant a settlement which, although prompted in part by defendant's interest
in foreclosing the possibility of class recovery, makes no provision for the asserted
class members.
Magana, 74 F.R.D. at 71 (citations omitted); see also Yaffe, 50 F.R.D. at 483 ("'[N]o litigant
should be permitted to enhance his own bargaining power by merely alleging that he is acting
for a class of litigants.' ") (quoting PhiladelphiaElec., 42 F.R.D. at 328); HarvardStudy, supra
note 1, at 1540.
35. See e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d
770, 775 (2d Cir. 1972) (rule 23(e) "does not bar non-approved settlements with individual
members [of the putative class] which have no effect upon the rights of others"); Rodgers v.
United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639, 642 (W.D. Pa.) (same), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d
365 (3d Cir. 1976); Nessenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 502-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
36. The requirement that an impartial judge scrutinize proposed settlements often provides the best protection for the putative class against collusive settlements. See 2 NEWBERG,
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The better view-and the one that appears to be gaining currency in
the federal system-strikes a balance between the deterrent function of
rule 23(e) in preventing abuse of the class action device on the one hand,
and the public policy of encouraging early settlement on the other. Adherents of this "functional approach" maintain that, while rule 23(e) requires judicial approval of settlements negotiated prior to certification,
notice of a proposed individual settlement may be unnecessary when it
the
would not serve the underlying aims of the rule-namely, to protect
37
settlements.
collusive
deter
to
and
class
putative
the
of
interests
Although such a reading of rule 23(e) does some violence to the
plain language of the rule,3 8 this more flexible approach may be particunot bound to apply
larly appealing to the California courts, which are
39
mechanically the strictures of federal rule 23(e).
supra note 2, § 11.63, at 503 ("Particularly before there has been any class ruling, the court is
in the position to monitor instances of potential abuse for private benefit, while encouraging
settlements in the public interest.").
37. See Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1314 (4th Cir. 1978) (court may approve a
settlement of the named plaintiff's claim without requiring that notice be given to putative
class members if "the court is clearly satisfied that there has been no abuse of the class action
device and no prejudice to absent putative class members"); In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d
1081, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Shelton with approval); Larkin Gen. Hosp. v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 93 F.R.D. 497, 501-03 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss
without notice to the putative class after satisfying itself that no prejudice to the putative class
would result); Jaen v. New York Tel. Co., 81 F.R.D. 696, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (approving
settlement without notice after observing that the reliance interest of the putative class was
particularly remote); Wallican v. Waterloo Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. 492, 493-94
(N.D. Iowa 1978) (finding the "functional approach to the notice element of Rule 23 to be a
sound one" and approving dismissal without notice after observing that "no danger of collusion between the parties or of a 'sell out' of the asserted class by plaintiffs appears to be present
here"); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (notice of precertification settlement to absent class members need not be given unless "facts surrounding the
compromise dictate class-wide disclosure in order to prevent Rule 23 abuse or protect the
interests of putative class members"); see also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 666 (7th Cir. 1981)
("the absolute notice requirement of Rule 23(e) is inapplicable to settled cases which have not
been certified"), cert. deniedsub nom. Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917 (1981); Gupta v.
Penn Jersey Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("notice to putative class members
of pre-certification dismissal or compromise is not mandated by Rule 23(e)") (emphasis added); Sheinberg v. Fluor Corp., 91 F.R.D. 74, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (approving dismissal without notice when the asserted class was large and individual notice would be extremely costly).
38. On its face, rule 23(e) appears to make notice mandatory. It provides that "notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shallbe given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P., 23(e) (emphasis added). Adherents of the functional approach maintain that the modifying phrase---"in such manner as the court directs"gives the court ample discretion to direct that no notice of a proposed settlement be given to
the putative class. See 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 11.64, at 505.
39. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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B. Cases Requiring Notice and Court Approval Pursuant to Rule 23(e)
The precertification settlement problem manifested shortly after the
promulgation of rule 23(e). 40 In PhiladelphiaElectric Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co.,4 1 the plaintiffs filed class actions against thirteen
separate defendants alleging conspiracies to violate federal antitrust laws.
Prior to certification, the named plaintiffs successfully negotiated settlement agreements with three of the thirteen defendants. These agreements contemplated the entry of final judgments barring all further
claims against the settling defendants by either the named plaintiffs or
any member of the class they purported to represent.42
The court first acknowledged that it was "necessary to consider
whether Rule 23(e) has any application to an action which, while
43
brought as a class action, has not yet been determined to be one."
Mindful of the fact that the proposed settlements sought "to compromise
the claims of the class, not just the named plaintiffs," 44 the court held,
"Rule 23(e) clearly applies to this situation; indeed, due process concepts
might well be held to require notice [to the putative class], even in the
absence of Rule 23(e). ' ' 45 Because the terms of the settlement would
have foreclosed members of the putative class from litigating their individual claims, the court ruled that during the interim between filing and
certification a purported class action "must be assumed to be a class ac40. In fact, the problem was recognized long before the adoption of subsection (e), which
was engrafted onto federal rule 23 in 1966 as part of a comprehensive package of amendments
proposed by the Advisory Committee and subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court. See

Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. app. at 427 (1976)
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Notes].
Prior to the 1966 amendments, federal rule 23(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), had provided as follows:
DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in

paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice
shall be given only if the court requires it.

In Hutchinson v. Fidelity Inv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 431, 436 (4th Cir. 1939), the Fourth Circuit
held that rule 23(c) was limited to the settlement of certified class actions and was not a "condition precedent to dismissal by the court" when the rights of individual litigants were
implicated.
41. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
42. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 326.
44. Id. at 327.
45. Id. For a brief discussion of the due process implications of class-wide settlements,
see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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tion for purposes of dismissal or compromise under 46
23(e) unless and until
a contrary determination is made under 23(c)(1)."
Most of the commentators, and many of the more thoughtful opinions, now recognize that the broad holding of PhiladelphiaElectric must
be understood in its proper factual context.4 7 There, the settlement
agreement was intended to bind the entire class, not just the named parties. 48 Nevertheless, several early cases, ostensibly relying on Philadelphia Electric, insisted on applying a blanket notice requirement to all
precertification settlements-even those in which the parties to the agreement conceded that it was without prejudice to the ostensible class.

For example, in Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp.,49 certain stockholders
of the defendant corporation brought a class action on behalf of themselves and other shareholders challenging the legality of a tender offer
launched by a rival of Detroit Steel. Despite repeated remonstrations by
the trial judge, the plaintiffs made no effort to certify the class. 50 Later,
while the judge was on vacation, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend
their complaint to delete their class allegations. 5 1 An interim judge

granted the motion, and a settlement agreement that provided
only for
52

the named plaintiffs was consummated shortly thereafter.
When the original judge returned from his vacation, he vacated the
order permitting the amendment.5 3 The court cited PhiladelphiaElectric
for the proposition that rule 23(e) applied to precertification settlements,
and, fearing that deletion of the class allegations would result in evasion
54
of the rule, ordered that consideration of the certification issue proceed.
46. PhiladelphiaElectric, 42 F.R.D. at 326. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Rule 23(c)(1) requires the district court to determine whether the asserted class is viable
"[a]s soon as practicable," after the filing of the suit. Generally speaking, the class will be
certified if the prerequisites of "numerosity," "commonality," "typicality," and adequacy of
representation are satisfied. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), supra note 19.
47. Almond, supra note 5, at 328; see-eg., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1309
(4th Cir. 1978) (observing that "[i]n PhiladelphiaElectric ... the parties were seeking to make
a settlement of a class action ... and to make that settlement binding on absent members of
that assumed class," but suggesting that "where there is no binding effect of the settlement on
absent potential class members" the necessity of court approval and notice is committed to the
discretion of the trial judge); Comment, Continuationand Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissalof the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 595 (authored by John W.
Welch) (noting that "considerations of due process required notice to be given to members of
the class" in PhiladelphiaElectric "because they would be bound by the consequences of the
settlement," but reasoning that these same considerations "are absent where the dismissal of
the action would not foreclose the class from seeking further relief").
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. 50 F.R.D. 481, 482 (N.D. 111. 1970).
50. Id
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id at 483.
54. Id.
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The judge opined that granting the amendment without notice to the
putative class members "could result in an unwitting forfeiture of their
55
rights."
Because the lawsuit had received publicity in the financial press, the
court expressed concern that "some class members, choosing to rely on
this lawsuit as their means of redress, [may] have decided not to file separate actions."' 56 Additionally, the opinion characterized the plaintiffs' attempts to abandon the putative class as "an impermissible abuse of the
class action device.... [since] the defendants might well be willing to pay
the named plaintiffs a premium for the elimination of the class, a pre' 57
mium to which they are, of course, not entitled.
The settlement agreement, however, did not purport to "eliminate"
the class. 58 Presumably, the absent class members in Yaffe would not
have been prejudiced materially by the settlement with the named plaintiffs because their claims would not have been barred by principles of res
judicata. 59 The best explanation for the result in this case may be that
the court believed that disallowance of the settlement, coupled with the
imposition of a burdensome notice requirement, would deter further
abuse of the class action device-in short, notice was exacted as a sanction for misusing the device and for playing "fast and loose" with the
court. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the drafters of rule 23(e)
ever seriously contemplated such a punitive application of the rule. 6°
Rather, the generally accepted function of the rule is to prevent abuse of
the class action device in derogation of the rights of the putative class 61a situation arguably not confronted by the Yaffe court.
Similarly, in Rothman v. Gould,62 the plaintiff brought suit on behalf
of himself and a purported class of defrauded investors, claiming violations of the federal securities laws. Two years later, the issue of class
55.

Id.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. Absent putative class members will not be bound by the terms of a settlement agreement unless the class is certified in connection with the settlement. See supra note 2; see also
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 1981) ("a settlement entered without class certification ... will not have a res judicata effect on the claims of absent class members").
60. The Advisory Committee Notes provide few insights into the motivations of the
drafters of rule 23(e). They simply state that "[s]ubdivision (e) requires approval of the court,
after notice, for the dismissal or compromise of any class action." Advisory Committee Notes,
supra note 40, at 431.
61. See, e.g., Nesenoffv. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Rule 23(e)... is
designed to guard against the possibility of a self-appointed class representative unilaterally

settling or compromising his claim in derogation of the rights of the class as a whole."); 2 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 11.63, at 502 ("A major purpose of Rule 23(e) is to discourage the
use of the class action device to secure an unjust private settlement for the named plaintiff to
the detriment of the remainder of the putative class.").
62. 52 F.R.D. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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certification still remained unresolved. The plaintiff, seeking to remove
the final barrier to settlement, moved to excise the class allegations from
his complaint, conceding that they had been "no more than an afterthought. ' 63 The court would have no part of it:
The very bringing of a class action... may deter the institution of suits
by members of the ostensible class. The passage of time may impair or
defeat the rights of others thus deflected from acting for themselves
In a word, having nominated themselves as class representatives,
both plaintiff and his counsel have undertaken responsibilities, and
triggered possible consequences that may not now
64 be erased by routine
acceptance of the resignation they now tender.
The Yaffe and Rothman courts were preoccupied with the possibility of detrimental reliance by the putative class. The reliance interest
that the courts have sought to protect implicates two basic concerns.
The first concern-that the passage of time might defeat the claims of
potential class members who relied upon the filing of the class suit and
therefore abstained from seeking legal redress-is now largely of historical interest. The United States Supreme Court resolved this concern in

American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,65 when it held that the filing

of a timely class action tolls the statute of limitations for all members of
the putative class until a final determination is made regarding the propriety of class certification. Of course, Rothman and Yaffe scarcely can
be criticized on this basis since those cases antedate American Pipe by
three and four years, respectively.
Second, the courts have expressed concern that, although the statute
of limitations is tolled when a class action is filed, it begins to run anew if
the case is dismissed. 66 Thus, potential class members who learned
through informal publicity or other means that a suit had been com63. Id.
64. IdMat 496. The parties' attempts at amicable resolution of their dispute triggered
serious consequences indeed. The defendants, faced with the onerous task of providing "some
decent notice" to the putative class, simply withdrew their settlement offer. Id at 496. In
addition, the plaintiff's candid admission about the insertion of the class allegations in his
complaint later proved to be a double-edged sword. When the plaintiff sought to have the class
certified after it became clear that the settlement was beyond repair, the defendants embraced
the plaintiff's earlier position that the action was inappropriate for class treatment. Id at 498.
The court, unable to agree fully with either side, ordered that notice of the proposed settlement, and the antics leading up to it, be published in the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal. Id. Significantly, the defendants were assessed the costs of publishing the required
notice. Id
65. 414 U.S. 538, 553-54, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974). This is commonly referred
to as the federal "tolling doctrine."
66. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1977) (implying that
the original statute of limitations begins to run anew upon denial of certification); see generally
Wheeler, PredismissalNotice andStatutes ofLimitationsin FederalClass Actions After American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.771, 781-82 (1975).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

menced, but not that it had been terminated, nevertheless might lose
their claims to the running of the statute. 67 This second concern, though
legitimate, does not justify the result in Rothman. There, the plaintiff
had intimated that the class allegations in his complaint were little more
than a ruse designed to enhance his personal bargaining power. 68 Additionally, there was no evidence that the suit had received any publicity
whatsoever, nor were there any facts from which the court could conclude that there was such a class and that its members were actually and
justifiably relying on the named plaintiff to advocate their cause. The
remote possibility of detrimental reliance by the putative class, did not
justify saddling the Rothman defendants with the costs of notifying a
"class" that may have existed only in the plaintiff's concededly unfounded complaint. 69 On the other hand, the Yaffe court's decision to
notify the putative class is, perhaps, more defensible in light of the pub70
licity that suit received.
In Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School District,7 1 and Duncan v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 72 a Wisconsin district court similarly or-

dered that notice of proposed precertification settlements be given to
members of the putative classes. As in Rothman and Yaffe, these settlements sought to compromise only the claims of the named plaintiffs and
were without prejudice to the alleged classes. 73 But unlike those cases,
Rotzenburg and Duncan were decided after the Supreme Court's announcement of the "tolling doctrine" in American Pipe.74 Consequently,
the court could not, and did not, claim that notice was necessary in order
to protect putative class members from the running of the statute of limitations. More puzzling, however, was the court's failure to address the
reliance interest of the putative class or to advance any considered rationale for its imposition of notice.
While these opinions demonstrate a commendable solicitude for the
rights of absent class plaintiffs, they blur the distinction between settlements that inure strictly to the benefit of the named parties, and those
that seek to compromise the claims of the class as a whole. In the latter
67. See Harvard Study, supra note 1, at 1541.
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
69. "Until a class is actually defined, any interest or expectation by an alleged member in
a recovery ... must be classified as speculative." Almond, supra note 5, at 331.
70. See supra text accompanying note 56. In Yaffe certain press releases concerning the
lawsuit had found their way into the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, plaintiffs' counsel had
participated in drawing up proxy materials sent to Detroit Steel shareholders that alluded to

the pending class action suit. Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
71.
72.

64 F.R.D. 181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (Gordon, J.).
66 F.R.D. 615, 616 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (Gordon, J.).

73. Duncan, 66 F.R.D. at 616; Rotzenburg, 64 F.R.D. at 182.
74. 414 U.S. 538 (1974); see supra note 65 and accompanying text. American Pipe was
decided on January 16, 1974. The Rotzenburg decision was entered on September 12, 1974;
Duncan was decided on March 28, 1975.
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situation, federal constitutional due process considerations compel the
giving of notice to the potential class. 75 But when the settlement seeks
only to bind individual class members, a blanket notice requirement may

not only result in the abandonment of a reasonable settlement offer, but
also may materially prejudice defendants (who often are taxed with notice costs), and contribute needlessly to the congestion of the nation's
court system by fomenting spurious litigation. 76 Indeed, such a requirement is often tantamount to the solicitation of clients for plaintiffs' coun77
sel under the tacit approval of the court.
C. Cases Dispensing With Notice and Court Approval
A number of federal courts have devised methods of circumventing
the stringent notice and court approval requirements of rule 23(e) at the
precertification stage. One line of cases simply denies the applicability of
the rule prior to the certification decision, except in cases in which the
settling parties have sought affirmatively to prejudice the rights of alleged
75. See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973) (when the substantive rights of absentee class members are at stake, constitutional standards of due process
compel notice to those members); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 69 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (same).
76. See Elias v. National Car Rental Sys. Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973) (suggesting that mandatory notice is equal to "soliciting a client for plaintiff's counsel under the
aegis of the court. This would be improper."). One commentator has been vociferous in his
criticism of the notice requirement in uncertified class actions, particularly as it relates to
actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)1-17. He suggests that,
[t]his notice, a legal document bearing the imprimatur of a United States district
court judge, might best be described.., as an "invitation to sue letter." The disclosure of a cash settlement will likely prove an irresistible temptation for many and
serve only to solicit new party plaintiffs for a lawsuit now abandoned by its original
champions. The lesson to be learned by recipients of the notice is that they should
sue the named defendant and that, regardless of the merits of the claim, the defendant will probably pay a considerable sum to settle out of court.
Almond, supra note 5, at 313-14.
77. The hypothetical scenario posited by Almond is helpful in illustrating this point:
P1 sues D, claiming to represent a class of 100 potential plaintiffs. P1 settles his
individual claim against D, but the court requires precertification notice to the remaining 99 "class members." Sensing a windfall, P2 (one of the 99) then sues D for
himself "and others similarly situated." As expected, P2 settles with D prior to class
certification. Will D be required to send out a second notice to the remaining 98?
And if P3, P4 and P5 settle their individual claims respectively, must D repeatedly
notify the dwindling members of a "class" which has never been called upon to prove
its viability under rule 23? By the time P50 has received 49 legal settlement notices
signed by a federal district judge, can it reasonably be expected that P50 will not have
gotten the message-that he will not, in turn, file his own "class action"? Add the
fact that this succession of individual "class actions" tolls the statute of limitations
on all outstanding potential claims, thus extending D's risk exposure far beyond the
anticipated time limits of the appropriate statute of limitations.
Almond, supra note 5, at 314 n.63.
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class members. 78 Courts adopting this view generally attribute little, if
any, significance to the potential "reliance interest" of putative class
members.
A few courts have opted for an even more novel approach. These
courts make a threshold determination as to the propriety of class treatment. 79 If the court is unpersuaded that the class is viable, the court's
function is ended and notice is unnecessary.
(1) Rule 23(e) Does Not Apply
One group of cases has rejected the broad language of Philadelphia
Electric,80 and has held simply that rule 23(e) is inapplicable on its face
to precertification settlements with individual class members. Most of
these cases rely on dicta in Weight Watchers of Philadelphia v. Weight
Watchers International81 In Weight Watchers, the plaintiff-franchisee
filed a class action complaint containing various price-fixing allegations
against a franchisor of weight reduction clinics. Before the class was certified, a dispute arose concerning the defendant's right to communicate
settlement overtures to the franchisees who constituted the alleged
class. 8 2 The issue on appeal was whether the court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to review a district court order that permitted the de83
fendant to negotiate these individual settlements with its franchisees.
The court noted in passing that rule 23(e), "requiring court approval of
the dismissal or compromise of a class action, does not bar non-approved
settlements with individual members which have no effect upon the
rights of others."' 84 Earlier in the opinion, Judge Friendly remarked that
"it is only the settlement of the class action itself without court approval
that [rule] 23(e) prohibits."8 5
Several lower federal courts were quick to seize on Judge Friendly's
comments in Weight Watchers. For example, in Nesenoff v. Muten, 86 a
New York district court reasoned that precertification settlement of individual class members' claims did not implicate rule 23(e): "Rule 23(e)
... is designed to guard against the possibility of a self-appointed class
representative unilaterally settling or compromising his claim in derogation of the rights of the class as a whole ....
Here, no such problem
87
exists."
78.

See infra notes 80-114 and accompanying text.

79.

See infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.

80.
81.
82.

42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967); see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J.).
Id. at 772.

83. Id. at 771.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 775.
Id. at 773.
67 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).

87.

Id. at 502-03.
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In Nesenoff holders of common stock in Digiac Corporation commenced a class action against the corporation's board of directors. The
plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the board's approval of a merger violated state and federal securities laws. 8 Thereafter, a boardmember offered to purchase the stock of certain alleged class members, apparently
in an effort to reduce the size of the class and thereby defeat the "numerosity" requirement. 89 The Nesenoff plaintiffs contended that the defendant's offer constituted a further violation of the federal securities laws
since he had failed to disclose that the real reason for the stock purchases
was to invalidate the fledgling lawsuit. 90 Additionally, the plaintiffs
maintained that the offer violated rule 23(e) since the stock purchases
were negotiated without prior court approval. 9 1
The court disagreed. Citing Judge Friendly's comments in Weight
Watchers, the court concluded that
such settlements do not affect the rights of the other potential class
members. The plaintiffs' class action complaint has not been disturbed, nor have the other potential class members been prohibited
from intervening in the instant suit or commencing their 92
own suit in
the event that the plaintiffs' class action motion is denied.
Having determined that rule 23(e) was inapplicable to individual settlements negotiated at the precertification stage, the court concluded that it
lacked authority to undertake even a supervisory role in connection with
93
the contemplated stock purchases.
Likewise, in Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.,94 certain minority
employees of the defendant corporation brought a class action against
their employer and various labor unions alleging racially discriminatory
practices in the steel industry. Thereafter, the defendant tendered back
pay to certain potential class members in exchange for a waiver of their
rights to damages under the class action. 9 5 The named plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the individual settlements, which they argued were in contra96
vention of rule 23(e).
88. Id. at 501.
89. The "numerosity" requirement, a prerequisite to class action treatment under rule 23,
ensures that the class is so numerous that joinder of all the parties under the conventional
joinder provisions of the federal rules is not feasible. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), supra note
19.
90. Nesenoff, 67 F.R.D. at 502.
91. Id. The plaintiffs apparently argued that each stock purchase was, in effect, a "compromise" within the meaning of rule 23(e) and so implicated the court approval requirements
of the rule. Id
92. Id. at 503 (footnote omitted).
93. Id at 503 n.4.
94. 70 F.R.D. 639, 640 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 640-41.
96. Id at 642.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

The court refused to enjoin the settlements. Citing Weight Watchers, the court ruled that the named plaintiffs' reliance upon rule 23(e) was
misplaced:
By its terms, Rule 23(e) applies and is limited to the dismissal or
compromise of a class action itself, where application of its strictures is
necessary to protect the rights of absentee or nonparty class members
who may be bound or affected by a settlement of their claims by their
class representatives. In contrast, the Rule does not attach to direct
settlements with individual
class members which have no effect upon
97
the rights of others.
As Nesenoff and Rodgers illustrate, courts declining to apply rule
23(e) at the precertification stage generally have been confronted with
attempts by defendants to settle the individual claims of potential class
members other than the named representatives.9 8 When the potential
class is large, the aggregate effect of such settlements is likely to be negligible, because the representative plaintiffs can simply certify a class consisting of the remaining, nonsettling absentees. If, however, the
defendant ultimately succeeds in settling with a substantial percentage of
the alleged class, the numerosity requirement, a prerequisite to class certification, may be defeated. In such cases, it hardly can be said that the
individual settlements "have no effect upon the rights of others." 99
The Second Circuit recently reviewed the Weight Watchers dicta in
a slightly different context. Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Investment
Corp. 00 involved the merger of The Continental Group (Continental)
into a subsidiary of Kiewit-Murdock Investment Corporation (Kiewit).
Under the terms of the merger, Continental's common stock was
"cashed-out,"''
while holders of Continental preferred stock received
newly issued shares in the Kiewit subsidiary. 102 After the merger, certain stockholders who had received preferred shares in the surviving corporation brought a class action in a federal district court on behalf of all
former holders of Continental preferred stock that had been exchanged
pursuant to the merger. They alleged that the merger had rendered the
new corporation virtually insolvent and had left them with "speculative
97. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
98. See e.g., American Fin. Sys. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 575 (D. Md. 1974) (rule 23(e)
did not prohibit trustee of profit sharing retirement trust from notifying nonparty trust beneficiaries in title VII sex discrimination class action of its willingness to enter into individual
settlements with members of the uncertified class).
99. Weight Watchers of Philadelphia v. Weight Watchers International, 455 F.2d 770,
775 (2d Cir. 1972); Rodgers, 70 F.R.D. at 642.
100. 815 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 250 (1987).
101. In a "cash-out merger," the acquiring corporation pays cash to the shareholders of
the corporation it wishes to acquire (in this case, holders of Continental's common stock)
rather than issuing stock in the surviving corporate entity. See generally 1 M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.03[3][a] (rev. ed. 1988).
102. Christensen, 815 F.2d at 207-08 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
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low grade, highly leveraged securities" rather than cash. 10 3 Among
other things, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling Kiewit to redeem
their preferred shares. 104
Prior to certification of the class, Kiewit announced a tender offer
for all of the outstanding preferred shares.10 5 The plaintiffs thereafter
moved to dismiss the action as moot since the tender offer provided the
entire class with relief "substantially equivalent" to that sought in the
complaint.' 0 6 In addition, however, the plaintiffs sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs on the ground that Kiewit's tender offer constituted a "flagrant avoidance" of rule 23(e).10 7 The district court
dismissed the action, but denied the plaintiffs' application for fees and
costs.10 8 The court of appeals, over a vigorous dissent, affirmed.' 0 9
Writing for the majority, Judge Timbers remarked that the plaintiffs
"did not violate Rule 23(e); nor did they 'flagrantly', or even 'brazenly',
ignore it."110 Rather,
Weight Watchers establishe[d] that, at least prior to class certification, defendants do not violate Rule 23(e) by negotiating settlements
with potential members of a class. In the instant case, therefore, even
if the tender offer were deemed to have been a settlement or "compromise," Kiewit Corp. neither violated nor ignored Rule 23(e). There is
simply no basis for concluding that any of the [defendants] acted in
bad faith, justifying an award of attorneys' fees and costs.'
In his dissent, Judge Feinberg first noted "that the spirit and policies
behind Rule 23 may apply in the pre-certification stage of a class suit
.... " 112 He then chastened the majority for its myopic application of the
Weight Watchers dictum and distinguished the defendants' conduct from
that of the defendants in Weight Watchers. Unlike the defendants in
Weight Watchers, "through the public tender offer [the] defendants [in
this case] extended an offer to the entire putative class-an offer that
effectively settled the case by mooting the entire action. This is precisely
the activity that Rule 23(e) was designed to control through judicial review and supervision."' " 13 The dissent concluded that the defendants' ac103. Id at 208-09, 216.
104. Id. at 209.
105. Id
106. Id. at 208, 210.
107. Id. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the American rule, which generally precludes litigants from recovering attorneys' fees, is inapplicable when the losing party has acted
in "bad faith." Because the Kiewit tender offer was launched allegedly in "flagrant avoidance"
of rule 23(e), the plaintiffs felt themselves entitled to an award of fees and costs under this socalled "bad faith" exception to the rule. Id at 212.
108. Id at 208.
109. Id.
110. Id at 213 (Timbers, J.).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 217 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
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tions had violated rule 23(e) by circumventing the remedial procedures
of
14
the rule, thus entitling the plaintiffs to an award of attorneys' fees.
Weight Watchers and its progeny are not alone in finding that rule
23(e) does not apply to precertification settlements. Although the United
States Supreme Court has never confronted directly the applicability of
rule 23(e) at the precertification stage, 1 5 one commentator has argued
that dictum in Sosna v. Iowa 116forecloses the application of rule 23(e)
prior to certification." 17 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Sosna Court,
remarked in a footnote that "[o]nce [a]suit is certified as a class action, it18
may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court.""1

Professor Wheeler suggests that "[t]he clear implication of the italicized
statement is that the requirement of court approval for settlement or dismissal embodied in rule 23(e) does not apply until an action has been
certified as a class action." 119
Professor Wheeler's interpretation of the Sosna dictum has received
mixed reviews in the lower courts. 12o Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
the Court attributes the same significance to the dictum as Professor
Wheeler since the Court has repeated the celebrated language in Sosna
114. Id. at 218.
115. In Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 947
(1980), the Court acknowledged that "[d]ifficult questions arise as to what, if any, are the
named plaintiffs' responsibilities to the putative class prior to certification." Id. at 340 n. 12
(emphasis in original). Regrettably, the Court concluded that "this case does not require us to
reach these questions." Id.
Deposit Guaranty is discussed infra at notes 121, 180, 184.
116. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
117. See Wheeler, supra note 66, at 775 n.16a.
118. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399 n.8, quoted in Wheeler, supra note 66, at 775 (emphasis added
by Wheeler).
119. Wheeler, supra note 66, at 775 n.16a (emphasis added).
120. For example, in Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 66 (S.D. Tex. 1977),
the court refused to "accept the negative implication urged by counsel that, in view of the...
language [of Sosna], Rule 23(e) and its requirement of notice should not be presumed to apply
prior to class certification." For a discussion of Magana, see infra notes 135-148 and accompanying text.
Likewise, in Duncan v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Wis. 1975),
the court suggested that
the Supreme Court's observation [in Sosna] that notice is required after certification
intimates no view on the more difficult question presented by this case: Is notice of a
compromise also required before a class action certification? I remain convinced that
notice to the alleged class members is mandated by Rule 23(e).
Id. at 616. But see Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1304 (4th Cir. 1978) ("We are
convinced ... that Professor Wheeler is more accurate in his reading of Sosna, particularly in
light of later cases pointing clearly in the same direction, that 23(e) applies only to the dismissal of the class action."). For a discussion of Shelton, see infra notes 149-59 and accompanying
text.
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while acknowledging "that Rule 23(e) prescribes certain responsibilities
of a district court in a case brought as a class action .... -121
The inability of the Second Circuit to reach a consensus in Christensen 122 as to the applicability of rule 23(e), and the controversy surrounding the Sosna dictum, are symptomatic of the precertification settlement
problem-it does not lend itself to nice distinctions or easy solutions.
Some federal courts, however, have opted for a seemingly more enlightened approach to the problem.
(2) Expedited Ruling on Motion to Certify
A number of courts, while conceding that rule 23(e) arguably does
apply in the precertification setting, have attributed much significance to
language in PhiladelphiaElectric that an action fied as a class action
must be treated as such for purposes of compromise or dismissal "unless
and until a contrary determination is made under 23(c)(1)."1 23 These
cases avoid the rigid and potentially wasteful notice requirements of rule
23(e) by requiring an expedited preliminary ruling on the certification
issue. If the court determines that the action is unworthy of class action
status, then notice becomes unnecessary.
Pearson v. EcologicalScience Corp. 124 is illustrative of this approach.
In Pearson, two of the ninety-nine original and intervening plaintiffs in
sixteen consolidated securities fraud actions sought to overturn a settlement that had been approved by the district court.12 5 They argued that
121. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 n.5 (1980) (emphasis added).
In Deposit Guaranty, the Court held that the defendant's unsolicited payment to the named
plaintiffs of the amounts sought in their complaint did not render their cause of action moot.
Id Using language highly reminiscent of Sosna, the Court observed that
Rule 23(e) prescribes certain responsibilities of a district court in a case brought as a
class action: once a class is certified, a class action may not be 'dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.' Conceivably, there also may be circumstances, which need not be defined
here, where the district court has a responsibility, prior to approval of a settlement
and its dismissal of the class action, to provide an opportunity for intervention by a
member of the putative class for the purpose of appealing the denial of class
certification,

Id.
See infra notes 180, 184 for a discussion of Deposit Guaranty in connection with California's treatment of the mootness problem.
122. See supra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
123. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (emphasis added); see supra notes 31, 46 and accompanying text.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement
of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained .... "
124. 522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub norm Skydell v. Ecological Science

Corp., 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
125. Id. at 172.
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"the settlement was void as a matter of law as constituting a sale of class
rights by the named plaintiffs." 1 26 Before entering the parties' stipulations of settlement, the district court concluded that the action was inappropriate for class action treatment. 127 Thereafter, the settlements were
approved and the action was dismissed without notice to the putative
128
class and with prejudice only to the settling parties.
The appellate court unanimously affirmed, holding that when a
"court has ruled under Rule 23(c)(1) that an action cannot properly be
maintained as a class action the notice requirements of Rule 23(e) do not
apply, at least where the dismissal and settlement of the action do not
directly affect adversely the rights of individuals not before the court." 129
The court of appeals also took a pragmatic view of the problem of
detrimental reliance by members of the putative class:
We fail to understand how individuals could have relied on the
possibility that some day a court might determine that the suit was
proper for class action determination ....
[S]ince no Rule 23(c)(3)
notice of the maintenance of this litigation was ever given to nonparty
members of the originally alleged class, reliance by those individuals
on this action to recover their losses would be particularly
misplaced. 130
There is a certain seductiveness to this rationale, and the same reasoning would apply to the vast majority of precertification settlement
cases since notice of the pendency of the litigation rarely, if ever, is given
prior to the 23(c)(1) certification decision. But this approach ignores the
concerns expressed by the district courts in Yaffe 13 I and Rothman.1 32 In
those cases, the perceived danger that plaintiffs might have relied upon
the captioned parties to vindicate their rights was found to justify the
imposition of a broad notice requirement.1 33 Nevertheless, the expedited
certification approach has generated a modest following in the lower
courts,134 and may be appropriate in cases in which the "reliance inter126.
127.
128.

Id. at 176.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174-75.

129. Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 178.
131.

50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.

132. 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
133. See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The very bringing of a
class action, especially where counsel are known to be skilled in the field, may deter the institution of suits by members of the ostensible class."); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481,
483 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (observing that, because the lawsuit had received publicity in the financial
press, "[ilt is altogether possible.., that some class members, choosing to rely on this lawsuit
as their means of redress, have decided not to file separate actions").
134. See, e.g, Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 351 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (approving
a settlement agreement between the named parties without notice to the putative class after
determining that the action did not warrant class treatment because the named plaintiff was an
inadequate representative of the alleged class); Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prod. 61 F.R.D. 396, 398-
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est" of the putative class members seems particularly remote-for exam-

ple, when the suit has received little, if any, publicity.
D.

The "Functional Approach" to Rule 23(e)

An increasing number of courts have refrained from literal application of rule 23(e) in the precertification context. These cases are well
reasoned and provide a cogent analytical model for California courts
confronted with precertification settlement proposals.
Magana v. PlatzerShipyard, Inc. 135 was one of the first cases to endorse expressly the so-called "functional approach." In Magana, the
plaintiff brought a class action suit against his employer on behalf of all
"Black and Spanish surnamed American persons' denied employment
by the defendant. 136 The suit alleged discrimination on the basis of race
and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.137 Six months later, plaintiff's counsel had expended no significant
effort in ascertaining whether such a class actually existed. 138 Thereafter,
attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant submitted a settlement agreement to the court for approval. The agreement provided for payment of
$3,000 to the plaintiff in satisfaction of his individual claim and made no
provision for the alleged class members.139
The court first observed that rule 23(e) generally applied to precertification settlements of class actions. 14° The determination that.the rule
99 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (acknowledging that potential class members may rely on the named
plaintiffs to prosecute their claims, but refusing to require "the vain act of giving settlement
notice to an invalid class" after denying class certification for failure to satisfy the numerosity
requirement); Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973)
(concluding that named plaintiff's desire to withdraw his representation of the class rendered
him an inadequate class representative, thereby foreclosing the maintenance of a class action
and making notice unnecessary); Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542, 545
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that the class action device was not superior to other available methods of adjudication and approval by the court of a proposed compromise therefore was not
required).
135. 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
136. Id. at 63.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1974).
138. Magana, 74 F.R.D. at 64.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 63. The court reasoned that
because of the public interest in class litigation created by the allegation of classwide
injury, and the concern that the public interest has not been sacrificed for private
gain during settlement negotiations, the Court must fulfill the review and approval
duties imposed by Rule 23(e) before authorizing the entry of a joint stipulation of
dismissal.
Id. The court also emphasized that the federal courts have "recognized almost unanimously
that the allegation of a class in the complaint invokes the judicial duties imposed by Rule 23(e)
until such time as the Court determines that a class action is not proper." Magana, 74 F.R.D.
at 65 (citing, inter alia, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324
(E.D. Pa. 1967)).
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applied, however, was not dispositive of the matter. Instead, after recognizing that the court approval mandate of rule 23(e) was obligatory in all
cases prior to dismissal or compromise of the action, 14 ' the court concluded that the notice requirement should be imposed only when necessary to vindicate the reliance interest of the class or prevent the mischief
that the rule was designed to combat. 142
According to the court, the notice and court approval requirements
embodied in rule 23(e) further two basic aims: "(1) protection of the interests of putative class members by the Court; and (2) prevention of Rule
23 abuse characterized by collusion between the private parties to the
settlement, including counsel."'' 4 3 In light of these aims, the court held
141. Magana, 74 F.R.D. at 66.
142. Id. at 67.
143. Id. at 66 (emphasis in original). Further, the court was inclined "to place greater
emphasis on the 'prevention of abuse'" because
potential class members have a more speculative interest in the litigation than certified class members and . ..their expectations therefore should be accorded less
weight. Thus, the "protection of class" function embodied in Rule 23(e), although
important, is not paramount in the pre-certification stage, as it is once a class actually
is defined.
Id. at 66-67.
One commentator has been highly critical of courts that rely principally on the "prevention of abuse" rationale. See Almond, supra note 5, at 318, 325. He posits that "it is by
definition impossible for rule 23(e) notice to deter abuse that has already occurred in a pending
case, or to undo abuse that has already been done." Id. at 325 (emphasis in original).
Almond argues that "[b]oth abuse and reliance are engendered by the ability of named
plaintiffs and defendants to communicate with the purported class or to publicize the pending
action prior to a ruling on class certification." Id. at 338. He therefore concludes that "court
supervision and monitoring of communication and publicity effectively can eliminate any justifiable reliance upon the pending action by absentee 'class' members." Id. at 340.
Even if judicially imposed restrictions on communications with the putative class were
deemed a desirable policy, this approach arguably is foreclosed by Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452
U.S. 89, 94-95 (1981), in which the United States Supreme Court concluded that a federal
district court had exceeded its authority in imposing "a complete ban on all communications
concerning the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class
member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval of the court." The Court
remarked,
[T]o the extent that the district court is empowered.., to restrict certain communications in order to prevent frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise
the power without a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular
abuses by which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court must find that the
showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought would be
consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration to the narrowest
possible relief which would protect the respective parties.
Id. at 102 (quoting Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1977)).
Significantly, precertification communications have been expressly upheld in California.
See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 874, 212 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777
(1985) (holding that the trial court's approval of precertification notice by the named plaintiffs
to putative class members was proper, but finding that the trial court abused its discretion in
simultaneously restricting the defendant's access to the same individuals). The Atari court did
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that notice of a precertification settlement to absent class members was
not compelled as a matter of law in every case, but should depend upon
"whether or not the disclosed facts surrounding the compromise dictate
class-wide disclosure in order to prevent Rule 23 abuse or protect the
interests of putative class members." 144
In concluding that the notice requirement should be imposed on an
ad hoe basis, the Magana court disregarded ten years of precedent.
Although Judge Bue, who wrote the opinion, de-emphasized the novelty
of the approach, 14 5 he acknowledged that "in every reported decision located by this Court which discusses the propriety of class notice prior to
approval of an individual settlement, the courts unanimously have concluded that notice is necessary." 146 Thus, not surprisingly, the court appeared to favor notification of the putative class.147 Significantly,
however, the opinion left open the possibility that, in an appropriate case,
148
notice might not be required.

Shelton v. Pargo,Inc. 149 was such a case. Shelton similarly involved
a Title VII employment discrimination class action. While the certification issue was still pending, the parties agreed upon a cash settlement of
the individual claims of the captioned plaintiffs. 150 The district court apnote, however, that the parties' unfettered right to communicate with the putative class was to
be tempered by "either party's right to seek any protective order which probable circumstances
may make appropriate." Id at 873, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
144. Magana, 74 F.R.D. at 67.
145. Judge Bue suggested that rule 23(e) had "been accorded a flexible as opposed to a
wooden interpretation by some courts and authorities." Id (citing Elias v. National Car
Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973); HarvardStudy, supra note 1, at 1542 n.32;
Wheeler, supra note 66, at 785).
146. Id at 68.
147. Id at 69. The court, however, did not require that the putative class be notified of the
impending settlement. Rather, the court propounded interrogatories, sua sponte, and ordered
the parties to respond within twenty days in an effort to ascertain whether the reliance interest
of the putative class was sufficiently compelling to warrant notice. Id at 70-71, 78-80.
148. The Magana court was unwilling to "speculate in the abstract as to the factual circumstances in a given case which might justify an exception to the notice requirement." Id. at
69. But the court intimated that evidence of the putative class' potential for reliance would
militate in favor of notice. Significantly, "counsel's frank assessment as to the publicity, both
formal and informal, attendant to th[e] suit" was to be accorded great weight in the court's
notice equation. Id at 79. The court acknowledged, however, that "recognition of this reliance interest presupposes that one or more class members ha[d] actual knowledge of the pending class action. If there has been little, if any, formal or informal publicity about the suit, then
it is highly improbable that such an interest exists in fact." Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
The court also hinted that the defendant would have to overcome a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was being "bought off." "Mhe presumption should be that the spectre
of abuse in an individual settlement and class dismissal at the pre-certification stage is sufficient
to warrant notice to absent class members before court approval of any such arrangement."
Id. at 69.
149. 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978).
150. Id. at 1301. The settlement agreement contemplated payment of $2,519.20 in satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claims. Id
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proved the dismissal, but concluded that rule 23(e) required that notice
of the proposed settlement be given to members of the putative class. 15 1
The court of appeals disagreed. Finding support in the Weight
Watchers line of cases 152 and the Sosna dictum, 153 the court first noted
that "[b]y its explicit language, Rule 23(e) is confined in operation to the
settlement and dismissal of a 'class action.' ,,154 Nevertheless, the court
emphasized that the representative parties owed a fiduciary obligation to
the putative class:
[B]y asserting a representative role on behalf of the alleged class,
these appellees voluntarily accepted a fiduciary obligation towards the
members of the putative class they thus have undertaken to represent.
They may not abandon the fiduciary role they assumed at will or by
agreement with the appellant, if prejudice to the members of the class
they claimed to represent would result or if they have improperly
155 used
the class action procedure for their personal aggrandizement.
Consequently, the court found it necessary to posit a solution to the
problem of abuse of the class action device without looking to the compulsory notice provision of rule 23(e).
The court found federal rule 23(d) to be an appropriate tool for
combatting precertification abuse. Rule 23(d) empowers the district
courts to "make appropriate orders ... requiring, for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all
of the members of any step in the action . . . . 156 Thus, according to the
Shelton court, the district court had both the power and the duty under
rule 23(d) to ensure that the named plaintiff did not settle his individual
claim in a manner inconsistent with his assumed fiduciary duty or in a
manner that would unfairly prejudice the absent class members he
sought to represent. 157 Having concluded that rule 23(e) did not apply to
settlements negotiated at the precertification stage, and in light of the
158
unquestionably discretionary nature of the court's rule 23(d) powers,
the court had little difficulty in holding that
151.

Id.

152. See supra notes 80-114 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
154. Shelton, 582 F.2d at 1303.
155. Id. at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (emphasis added).
157. Shelton, 582 F.2d at 1306. The Shelton court suggested that the lower federal courts,
pursuant to rule 23(d), "have an ample arsenal to checkmate any abuse of the class action

procedure, if unreasonable prejudice to absentee class members would result, irrespective of
the time when the abuse arises." Id.

158.

See, e.g., Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 91 F.R.D. 208, 210 (E.D. Mo. 1981)

("Notice as to a precertification class action dismissal under [rule] 23(d)(2) is discretionary.");
Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 26, 33 (D. Haw. 1977) (same).
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the court is clearly satisfied that there has been no abuse of the
[i]f.
class action device and no prejudice to absent putative class members,
it may approve the settlement and dismissal without going through
with a certification determination or requiring notice to be given to
absent putative class members. 159

Magana and Shelton have spawned a discernible trend in the federal
courts favoring a more flexible approach to the precertification settlement quandary. 16° These cases, whether based upon a less stringent
159. Shelton, 582 F.2d at 1314.
Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to conduct a carefil hearing to determine whether the settling plaintiff and his attorney had used the class
action allegations to enhance their personal bargaining power, and to determine whether the
possible reliance interest of the putative class was sufficiently compelling to warrant notification of the absentees. Id at 1316. On remand, the district court ordered that notice of the
proposed settlement be sent to the putative class despite the clear mandate of the court of
appeals to the contrary. See Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 637, 641 (W.D.N.C. 1979). The
lower court's decision apparently was informed by a misguided, though well intentioned, belief
that it could not guard adequately against abuse by the parties or protect the reliance interest
of the putative class without affording notice to the "class" and an opportunity to be heard. In
any event, Shelton's unfortunate result on remand has not impaired significantly its precedential value. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
160. See, eg., Gupta v. Penn Jersey Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The plaintiff, a former franchisee of the defendant, filed an antitrust action on behalf of himself and
other similarly situated franchisees, alleging that the defendant had engaged in illegal "tie-in"
sales in violation of the Sherman Act. The defendant counterclaimed for alleged nonpayment
ofroyalties. Nine months after the suit was filed, and prior to a ruling on the plaintiff's motion
to certify the class, the parties negotiated a settlement. Id. at 1059. Under the terms of the
settlement, the plaintiff agreed to drop the class allegations, as well as his individual claims, in
consideration of the defendant's dismissal of the counterclaim and payment of the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees. Id
The court, citing Magana and Shelton, first suggested that "notice to putative class members of a pre-certification dismissal or compromise is not mandated by Rule 23(e)." Id at
1060 (emphasis added). The court' nevertheless concluded that notice to the former Penn
Jersey franchisees was required in order to vindicate the possible reliance interest of the putative class. Id at 1061.
See also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 666 (7th Cir.) (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit
"that the absolute notice requirement of Rule 23(e) is inapplicable to settled cases which have
not been certified," but emphasizing that "district courts should scrupulously scrutinize the
terms of settlement agreements for the impact on absent putative class members"), cert. denied
sub nom. Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917 (1981); In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d 1081,
1087 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Shelton with approval but declining to "address the broad question
whether notice under Rule 23(e) is ever mandatory in the precertification stage"); Larkin Gen.
Hosp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 93 F.R.D. 497, 501-03 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (granting plaintiff's
motion to dismiss without notice to the putative class after observing that no possible prejudice
to the putative class could result since an identical action was pending in another district
court); Sheinberg v. Fluor Corp., 91 F.R.D. 74, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (approving dismissal without notice when the asserted class was large and'individual notice would be extremely costly,
and where neither plaintiff nor her counsel received any payment for termination of the litigation); Jaen v. New York Tel. Co., 81 F.R.D. 696, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (approving settlement without notice after observing that the reliance interest of putative class was particularly
remote); Wallican v. Waterloo Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. 492, 493-94 (N.D. Iowa
1978) (finding the "functional approach to the notice element of Rule 23 to be a sound one"
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reading of rule 23(e) or upon the court's rule 23(d) supervisory powers,
share a single salient characteristic: they make notice to the putative
class discretionary when the named plaintiffs seek to compromise their
individual claims prior to the certification determination.
In recognition of this trend, the Litigation Section of the American
(A.B.A.) has proposed sweeping revisions of rule 23.161
Association
Bar
In particular, rule 23(e) would be amended to read as follows:
DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. An action filed as a class action shall
not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court. An
action ordered maintained as a class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the prosome
or all members
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to 16
2
of the class in such manner as the court directs.
The commentary of the A.B.A.'s Special Committee on Class Action Improvements (Committee Commentary) makes clear that "[t]here are
sound reasons for requiring judicial approval of a proposal to dismiss or
compromise an action filed . . . as a class action."' 6 3 The Committee
Commentary notes further, however, that "[t]he reasons for requiring
notice of such a proposal to members of a putative class are significantly
less compelling .... If circumstances warrant, the court has ample authority to direct notice to some or all putative class members pursuant to
the discretionary provisions of subdivision (d)."' 64 In short, while the
court approval requirement of proposed rule 23(e) would apply equally
to all class actions, regardless of whether the class has been certified, the
notice requirement would apply only to certified class actions. As in
Shelton, 165 curtailment of rule 23 abuse and protection of the reliance
and approving dismissal without notice after observing that "no danger of collusion between
the parties or of a 'sell out' of the asserted class by plaintiffs appears to be present here");

Johnson v. Wentz Equip. Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499, 1503 (D. Kan. Dec. 22,
1977) (finding that settlement was not a product of collusion and that, in the absence of reliance, notice was not necessary to protect putative class members).
161. See Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986) [hereinafter A.B.A. Report]. The Committee, comprising class action practitioners and two federal judges, submitted its
recommendations to the Council of the Section of Litigation, which approved the report. In
July 1985, the A.B.A. House of Delegates authorized the Section of Litigation to transmit its
recommendations to the Rules Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court, where the report
currently is being studied by the Advisory Committee's reporter. Id. at 196. The report has
not been approved or disapproved by the A.B.A. House of Delegates. Id.
While an extended discussion of the proposed rule is outside the scope of this Note, the
proposed revisions effectively address many of the concerns that currently undermine the integrity and effectiveness of the class action device.
162. Id. at 203 (emphasis added); cf supra text accompanying note 26.
163. A.B.A. Report, supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. 582 F.2d 1298, 1306 (4th Cir. 1978).
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interest of the putative class would be accomplished by resort to rule
23(d).
The courts and commentators advocating a functional approach to
the precertification settlement problem have recognized almost without
exception that court approval plays an important role in deterring abuse
of the class action device. On the other hand, notification of the alleged
class is warranted only when the court determines that approval of the
settlement proposal is likely to result in actual prejudice to the putative
class members if they are not apprised of the action's dismissal. The
federal courts have shown an increasing preference for this more flexible
approach, but it remains to be seen whether California will follow the
federal lead.

H. California's Approach to Precertification
Settlements and Dismissals
Section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 16 6 which au-

thorizes the class action device, does not provide for formal certification
of the class. Nevertheless, the California courts have recognized the importance of making a threshold determination as to the propriety of class
treatment and the composition of the class.1 67 Increasingly, the California courts have utilized the procedures of federal rule 23 when there is no
direct controlling California authority.1 68 For instance, the courts rou169
tinely "certify" class actions in accordance with federal rule 23(c)(1),
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973) provides that "when the question is one of
a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all."
167. For example, in Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 127
Cal. Rptr. 579 (1976), the court observed,
[A] primary procedural question in a class action is, who are the members of the
class? Promptand early determinationof the class is essential because until the composition of the class has been determined defendants cannot tell what the action involves, and until members of the class receive notice of the action they will not be
bound by any judgment in the action.
Id at 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (emphasis in original) (quoting Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (1974)); accordMassey v.
Bank of Am., 56 Cal. App. 3d 29, 32, 128 Cal. Rptr. 144, 146 (1976); see also Green v. Obledo,
29 Cal. 3d 126, 146, 624 P.2d 256, 268, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206, 218 (1981) ("[P]rocedural classaction issues-including the composition of the class-must ordinarily be resolved before a
decision on the merits is reached.").
168. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
169. See, eg., Green, 29 Cal. 3d at 146, 624 P.2d at 268, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 218; City of San
Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 453, 525 P.2d 701, 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (1974);
McGhee v. Bank of Am., 60 Cal. App. 3d 442,447, 131 Cal. Rptr. 482, 484-85 (1976). For the
text of federal rule 23(c)(1), see supra note 11.
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and look to the tripartite scheme of rule 23(b) in determining whether
notice of the pendency of the action is required. 170
Additionally, federal rule 23(e) has been applied in at least one reported case in which the named plaintiffs sought to dismiss a defendant
after the class had been certified. 17 1 Yet questions concerning the propriety of entering a dismissal or approving a settlement of the representative
parties' claims prior to judicial recognition of the class nevertheless persist in California.
A. La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association
La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association 172 generally is regarded as the leading California case addressing court approval and notice in the precertification context. In La Sala, the plaintiffs brought a
class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated borrowers, attacking the validity of a "due-on-encumbrance" clause 173 inserted
in deeds of trust used by the defendant lender. They claimed that the
challenged clause constituted an invalid restraint on alienation and
sought an injunction against enforcement of the clause, as well as com1 74
pensatory and punitive damages in an unspecified amount.
After the suit was filed, but before obtaining a ruling on certification
of the alleged class, the lender offered to waive enforcement of the challenged provision with respect to the named plaintiffs only. 175 The trial
court then ruled, sua sponte, that the litigation presented "no justiciable
issue," and removed the matter from its calendar. 76 Thereafter, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of a representative plaintiff. 177 Despite the plaintiffs' insistence that the dismissal be
accompanied by notice to the putative class, the court found that there
170.

See supra note 21.

171. See Simons v. Horowitz, 151 Cal. App. 3d 834, 841-42, 199 Cal. Rptr. 134, 138-39
(1984) (plaintiff and defendant class action in which named plaintiffs, who had dismissed a
member of the defendants' class in an apparent attempt to prevent him from filing an appeal,
"were required to seek court permission for the dismissal ... with notice and an opportunity to
be heard given to all members of the defendant class").
172. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
173. The clause provided:
Should Trustor sell, convey, transfer, dispose of or further encumber said property,
or any part thereof, or any interest therein, or agree to do so without the written

consent of Beneficiary being first obtained, then Beneficiary shall have the right, at its
option, to declare all sums secured hereby forthwith due and payable.
Id. at 869, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851. This provision permitted the lender to

accelerate any outstanding payments on the principle in the event that the borrower executed a
junior encumbrance on the secured property.
174. Id. at 868-70, 489 P.2d at 1115-16, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 850-52.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 870, 489 P.2d at 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
177.

Id.
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was "no individual plaintiff remaining who is or could be construed to be
a representative of the class," and granted the dismissal without prejudice and without notice to the members of the alleged class. 178
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that "whenever
dismissal of a class action stems from a defendant's grant of benefits to
the representative plaintiffs, which are not provided to the class as a
whole, the court may not dismiss the action without notice to the class
.... ,,179 Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, first observed that a
captioned plaintiff assumes a fiduciary .obligation to the putative class
members and thus, "surrender[s] any right to compromise the group action in return for individual gain."1 110 Consequently, the duty to continue
the action for the benefit of the putative class remains even if the named
plaintiff receives all of the benefits that he sought in the complaint. 8"
Although the trial court had summarily dismissed the action after
concluding that the representatives lacked any incentive to vigorously
pursue the litigation, the supreme court reasoned that the defendant's
waiver of the acceleration clause as to the named plaintiffs did not render
1 82
the representatives "unfit per se to continue to represent the class."
Rather, before dismissing the action, the trial court should have given
careful consideration to several factors relevant to the named plaintiffs'
fitness to represent the class. 183 According to Justice Tobriner, a trial
court could find that the named plaintiffs would continue to represent the
class fairly and adequately even though they had already received the
relief sought in their complaint.18 4 Additionally, even if the court
deemed the named plaintiffs unsuited to represent the class, the court
nevertheless should have afforded them the- opportunity to amend their
178. Id
179. Id at 868, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
180. Id at 871,489 P.2d at 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 852; accord Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 832, 839, 500 P.2d 621, 625, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1972); Mallick
v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 434, 437, 152 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court declined to address this issue in Deposit Guar. Nat'l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340 n.12 (1980) ("Difficult questions arise as to what, if any, are
the named plaintiffs' responsibilities to the putative class prior to certification; this case does
not require us to reach these questions."). See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
181. 5 Cal. 3d at 871, 489 P.2d at 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
182. Id.
183. Id at 871-72, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853. Chief among the factors that
would militate against allowing the named plaintiffs to continue their representation was the
possibility that the named plaintiffs' receipt of benefits, to the exclusion of the alleged class,
would create an impermissible "conflict of interest" between the class and its would-be representatives. Id at 872, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853. Apparently, the court was
concerned that the defendant might pressure the representatives to terminate the suit as a quid
pro quo for a cash settlement.
184. Id at 872, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853. See also Deposit Guar., 445 U.S. at
338-40 (named plaintiffs' potential entitlement to attorney's fees was sufficient interest to warrant their continued representation of the class).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

complaint, redefine 8the
class, or recruit an intervenor to pursue the ac5
tion in their stead.'
The court then discussed the propriety of notifying the putative
class if the foregoing options could not be implemented, and the action
was in jeopardy of being dismissed for lack of a suitable representative.
Recognizing that "no California statute or decision governs the dismissal
of class actions generally,"' 18 6 the court looked to the class action procedures of the federal rules. Finding support in both rule 23(e) and the
procedural provisions of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act,8 7 the court
concluded that "dismissal of the action requires prior notice to the
88
class."'1
Under federal law, involuntary dismissal for lack of a suitable representative generally does not give rise to a duty to notify the putative
class. The court recognized this, 189 but distinguished the plaintiffs' predicament on the ground that "the superior court did not find that plaintiffs were not, at the commencement of the action, proper representatives;
instead, the court ruled that by reason of defendant's waiver" the named
plaintiffs "were no longer suitable representatives."'1 90 Ultimately, however, the Court conceded that its holding essentially was result-oriented:
"If we sanction [the lender's] tactic defendants can always defeat a class
action by the kind of special treatment accorded plaintiffs here and thus
deprive other members of the class of the benefits of the litigation and
''
any notice of opportunity to enter into it. 191
The result in La Sala is not necessarily inconsistent with the functional approach to precertification settlements advocated by many federal courts. 192 Although the court seemed inclined to impose a blanket
notice requirement, its decision apparently was informed by the same
185. La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d. at 872, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
186. Id. (citing Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709, 433 P.2d 732, 742, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 734 (1967); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, 809 (1971)).
187. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985).
The court specifically referred to section 1781(f), which provides that "[a] class action
[brought under the Act] shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal, settlement, or compromise shall be given in
such manner as the court directs." Although the Act nominally applies only to consumer class
actions, the courts have found its provisions persuasive even when the Act did not govern the
case at bar. For a discussion of the Act and its relevance to the dismissal of class actions
generally, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
188. La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d at 873, 489 P.2d at 1118, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
189. Id. at 872-73, 489 P.2d at 1118, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 854; see Bantolina v. Aloha Motors,
Inc., 75 F.R.D. 26, 31 (D. Haw. 1977) (inability to maintain a class action due to lack of a
suitable representative plaintiff does not constitute a "dismissal" for purposes of rule 23(e)).
190. La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d at 873, 489 P.2d at 1118, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (emphasis in
original).

191.

Id.

192.

See supra notes 135-60 and accompanying text.

April 1989]

PRECERTIFICATION SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

897

remedial goals that underlie many of the federal cases construing rule
23(e)-namely, prevention of abuse, and protection of the putative
class. 193 There was no indication in La Sala that the class action device
had been employed by the plaintiffs for an improper purpose; 194 therefore, the imposition of notice could not be justified by the need to prevent
abuse of the class action device.1 95 Moreover, the court did not address
specifically the extent to which other borrowers may have refrained from
pursuing their individual claims in reliance on the named plaintiffs prosecution of the suit. Nevertheless, the court eschewed a formalistic approach to the precertification settlement problem, acknowledging that it
had adopted a "flexible" approach towards the class action device in past
196
decisions and implying that it would continue to do so in the future.
In sum, La Sala stands for the proposition that the courts will not
approve dismissals of class action suits if the named plaintiffs are to receive some benefit not made available, either directly or indirectly, to the
putative class members.1 97 Such a windfall, whether it results from a
settlement agreement or from the unilateral acts of the defendant, would
contravene the broad fiduciary duties that the representatives assume
when they file a suit on behalf of a class. On the other hand, the appellate courts have not embraced the blanket notice requirement that the La
Sala court purported to adopt, even in cases in which such notice arguably was warranted. 198
Although La Sala's "notice prong" has never been overruled expressly, lower courts confronted with attempts to settle the claims of the
captioned parties at the precertification stage have ignored uniformly the
Supreme Court's announced requirement of notice and at least one case
has implied that La Sala's notice requirement may be limited to the facts
of that case. 199 The same cannot be said of La Sala's court approval
requirement. With very few exceptions, the California courts have taken
193. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
194. Although the defendant alleged that the real reason for the plaintiffs' insistence on
notification of the putative class was to gain access to American's confidential loan fies, the
court was unpersuaded. La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d at 874 n.6, 489 P.2d at 1118 n.6, 97 Cal. Rptr. at

854 n.6.
195. See Almond, supra note 5, at 325 ("[I]t is by definition impossible for rule 23(e)
notice to deter abuse that has already occurred in a pending case, or to undo abuse that has
already been done.").
196. La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d at 883, 489 P.2d at 1125-26, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
197. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 214-19, 236 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Marcarelli v. Cabell, 58 Cal. App. 3d 51, 56 n.3, 129 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 n.3
(1976) (parties who had petitioned court for dismissal of their yet uncertified class action were
mistaken in their "assumption that La Sala's holding that there can be no dismissal of a class
action without notice to the class brooks no exception").
For a discussion of the Marcarelli case, see infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
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an expansive view of their duty to ensure that class action settlements are
fair and reasonable.
B. Post-La Sala Developments
In 1973, the Los Angeles Superior Court promulgated local rules
governing class action procedures. 2°° Superior Court rule 461, which essentially codifies La Sala,20 1 provides that "[a] settlement will not ordinarily be approved if as a result thereof the class representative will
receive some benefit not made available to the other members of the
class."' 20 2 The Superior Court Rules, however, do not address specifically the issues of court approval and notice to the putative class when a
settlement of the representative parties' claims precedes the court's determination of the class' viability.
Several appellate court decisions nevertheless have construed the
Superior Court Rules to require court approval of precertification settlements that seek to compromise the claims of the representative parties.
For example, in Marcarelliv. Cabell,20 3 the Second District Court of Appeal held that "a class action, once filed, may not be dismissed without
court approval ....-204
The plaintiffs in Marcarellifiled a class action complaint against numerous individual and corporate defendants, alleging a massive real estate fraud involving recreational property. They claimed to represent a
class of "several thousand persons. ' 20 5 Before the class was certified, the
captioned parties negotiated a settlement of the plaintiffs' individual
grievances. Thereafter, they filed a joint request for dismissal of the action; significantly, the terms of the settlement were not disclosed. 20 6 Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 470, which directs the county clerk not to
process requests to dismiss class actions without prior court approval,
the court clerk refused to enter the dismissal. The plaintiffs then filed a
petition for a writ of mandate to compel the clerk to perform his "non20 7
discretionary" duty to dismiss.
200. See SUPERIOR COURT RULES, supra note 21, rules 401-470. The Superior Court
Rules generated some controversy when they were initially promulgated. Although there was
concern that the Los Angeles courts would become a safe-harbor for defense lawyers seeking
to subject proposed class action suits to the heightened scrutiny of the local rules, see, e.g.,
ClassAction Suits: A New Controversy, L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1973, § 1,at 1, col. 1, this concern
failed to materialize, probably in large part due to the unifying influence of federal rule 23 on
the state's courts.
201. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
202. SUPERIOR COURT RULES, supra note 21, rule 461 (Nature of Class Action Settlement
Hearings).
203. 58 Cal. App. 3d 51, 129 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1976).
204. Id. at 53, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.

April 1989]

PRECERTIFICATION SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

899

The court of appeal upheld the court clerk's refusal to enter the dismissal. The court noted that Superior Court Rule 470 "necessarily follows from the Supreme Court's holding in [La Sala], that '[w]hen a
plaintiff sues on behalf of a class, he assumes a fiduciary obligation to the
members of the class, surrendering any right to compromise the group
action in return for an individual gain.' "208
The plaintiffs, who brought the mandamus action, advanced three
possible theories supporting the dismissal of their class claims without
the court's blessing. First, they argued that La Sala "held only that a
defendant cannot, over the plaintiffs objection, achieve dismissal of an
action brought as a class action by mooting the case as to the named
plaintiffs. ' 20 9 Their situation was distinguishable because unlike the La
Sala plaintiffs, they had no objection to the dismissal. The court found
this argument unpersuasive:
[I]n La Sala the named plaintiffs continued to speak for the class, even
after the defendant offered them full satisfaction of their personal
claims. Surely the plaintiffs in this case cannot make a virtue out of
their basic difficulty: that, having settled their own claims,
they no
2 10
longer wish to act for the class they assumed to represent.
Next, the plaintiffs contended that section 581 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure3" confers upon the plaintiffs an unconditional
right to dismiss an action at any time prior to trial. The court disagreed,
finding the plaintiffs' position "irreconciliable [sic] with the mandate of
La Sala"212 and suggesting that class actions were excepted from "'the
supposed absolute right to dismiss.' ",213
The plaintiffs' final argument, and the court's puzzling response, is
indicative of the failure of the California Courts to provide meaningful
guidance to litigants seeking amicable resolution of their disputes and
legitimate termination of their responsibilities to the putative class. The
Marcarelli plaintiffs argued that, under La Sala, the trial court most
likely would condition approval of their settlement with the defendants
208. IM (quoting La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 804, 871, 489 P.2d
1113, 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971)).
209. Id. at 54, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 511 (emphasis in original).
210. Id at 54-55, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
211. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 581 (West 1976) (lain action may be dismissed... [b]y
plaintiff... at any time before the actual commencement of trial, upon payment of the costs of
the clerk or judge").
Section 581 was materially amended in 1986, partially in response to concerns about
abuse of the class action device. Subdivision (j) now provides that "[n]o action may be dismissed which has been determined to be a class action under the provisions of this code unless
and until notice that the court deems adequate has been given and the court orders the dismissal." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 5810) (West Supp. 1988). Unfortunately, the new statute
suffers from the same defect as federal rule 23(e): it does not explicitly address the proper
procedures when either or both of the parties seek a precertification dismissal.
212. Marcarelli, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 55, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
213. Id. (quoting 4 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 49, at 2713 (2d ed. 1971)).
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on notification of the putative class. 2 14 The plaintiffs contended further
that "judicial diseconomies and litigation inefficiencies inevitably would
result from a rule requiring the trial court to withhold approval of a
requested voluntary dismissal unless and until predismissal notice has
been provided to the alleged class." 21 5 In essence, the plaintiffs urged the
court to adopt a more flexible approach to the notification issue than that
suggested by the La Sala court.
Ultimately, the court declined to rule on the propriety of notifying
the putative class, remarking that "[w]hether an eventual dismissal will
have to be preceded by notice to the [putative] class is a problem down
the road." 21 6 Thus, the Marcarellidecision apparently is limited to upholding the validity of the court approval requirements of Superior Court
Rule 470. The court's remarks, however, did suggest that it may have
misapprehended the salutary function served, in an appropriate case, by
precertification notice to the putative class.
For instance, the court's unsupported suggestion that federal rule
23(e) was inapplicable, because that rule dealt only "with dismissals and
compromises intended to bind the entire class," 217 does not acknowledge
contrary authority, 2' 8 and fails to address the possibility that putative
class members may have a legitimate reliance interest in the maintenance
of the suit. Moreover, this suggestion contradicts the holding in La Sala.
There the supreme court, relying principally upon rule 23(e), ordered
that the putative class be notified of the named plaintiffs' receipt of benefits from the defendant even though the putative class members were in
21 9
no way bound by the defendant's shenanigans.
214. Id. at 56, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 512. Indeed, such a result would follow from the holding
in La Sala: "[W]henever the dismissal of a class action stems from a defendant's grant of
benefits to the representative plaintiffs, which are not provided to the class as a whole, the
court may not dismiss the action without notice to the class." 5 Cal. 3d 864, 868, 489 P.2d

1113, 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (1971).
215.

Marcarelli,58 Cal. App. 3d at 56, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 512.

216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id. at 57, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (rule 23(e)

applied to dismissal of uncertified class action with prejudice as to the named plaintiff only);
Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 481, 482-83 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (same). But see Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc.
v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1972) (rule 23(e) "does not bar nonapproved settlements with individual members [of the putative class] which have no effect

upon the rights of others"); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639, 642 (W.D.
Pa.) (same), appealdismissed, 541 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1976); Nesenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500,
502-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
219. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. The Marcarelli court's reluctance to require the parties to notify the putative class supports the argument that La Sala's "notice
prong" is limited to its facts. See supra at notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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Superior Court Rule 470 also engendered a dispute in Anthony v.
Superior Court.220 There, the captioned parties jointly sought a writ of
mandate to compel the trial court to dismiss their suit after negotiating a
settlement agreement. 22 1 The class action in Anthony arose out of alleged
defects in disc wheels manufactured by Kelsey-Hayes Corporation and
sold by General Motors (GM) as optional equipment on several models
of its trucks.222 The plaintiffs, purchasers of trucks equipped with the
allegedly defective wheels, brought an action on behalf of themselves and
other GM truck owners. They sought to compel GM to undertake a
"product safety recall" and pay for the replacement and installation of
new wheels. 223 Additionally, the plaintiffs' complaint sought $157.5 million in compensatory damages for, among other things, depreciation in
the value of the trucks, loss of use, inspection costs, and alleged unfair
business practices; exemplary damages of $160 million also were
224
sought.
Before the purported class of GM truck owners was certified, the
Department of Transportation brought a separate action against GM in a
Delaware federal court, seeking to assess a $400,000 administrative fine
against the car manufacturer for the wheel defect. 225 Pursuant to a consent decree in that case, GM recalled the designated trucks,
agreeing to
226
replace the defective wheels at no cost to their owners.
The Anthony plaintiffs thereafter agreed to drop their class action
suit without prejudice to the putative class in consideration of GM's reimbursement of $300,000 in attorneys' fees. 227 They claimed that the
"primary relief" sought in their complaint-namely, replacement of the
defective wheels-had been obtained as a result of the court-ordered recall campaign. 228 Consequently, the settlement agreement made no provision for the payment of money damages to either the2 named
plaintiffs
29
or the class of truck owners they claimed to represent.
The trial court refused to dismiss the action. Despite GM's arguments that the plaintiffs' prayer for damages was "just window dressing," 230 the court found the settlement "deficient" because it was "made
220. 59 Cal. App. 3d 760, 130 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1976).
221. Id at 762-65, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 759-62.
222. Idk at 762, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
223.
224,
225.
226,
227.

Id
Id at 763, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61.
Id. at 762-63, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
Id. at 764, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
Id

228.

Id.

229.

Id at 775, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68. It bears noting that the settlement agreement

that was submitted to the court for approval characterized the plaintiffs' claimed damages
(which exceeded $300 million) as "of little, if any, significance...." Id at 775, 130 Cal. Rptr.
at 768.
230. Id at 766, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
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clearly in consideration of $300,000 to be paid by defendant to the attorneys for plaintiff class," and there had been "no showing that $300,000
adequately compensate[d] the class for its surrender of its several claims
for money damages. ' 231 Additionally, the court noted that even "assuming that $300,000 would be a fair settlement of the class' money claims
against the defendant, there is no showing that it is fair to appropriate
232
the entire amount to the class' attorneys."
The appellate court, quoting Marcarelli,23 3 denied the Anthony petitioners' application for a writ of mandate and affirmed the lower court's
refusal to enter the dismissal, holding that " 'a class action, once filed,
may not be dismissed without court approval .... ",234 The court's
opinion focused primarily on the role of court approval in preventing
settlement abuse:
That the use of the device of a class action is subject to abuse in a
'

number of ways is a well-known fact ....

[Ilt is the responsibility of

the court to guard the integrity of the class action device as well as its
own integrity ....

"The present arrangement leaves the unfortunate

impression that defendants are buying themselves
out of a lawsuit by
'235
direct compensation of plaintiffs' counsel.
Unfortunately, however, the court circumvented the notice issue, and declined to "reach the question of what would be required by way of notice
to the class if the plaintiffs' proposed disposition of the action had other'236
wise been determined to be proper.
2
37
With one notable exception, the California courts have not delineated the circumstances under which putative class members should receive notice of proposed individual settlements at the precertification
stage. Dictum in at least one recent appellate court decision suggests
that the California courts may be moving away from the rigid, doctrinaire approach to precertification issues that characterized many of the
early post-PhiladelphiaElectric federal cases. 238 It remains uncertain,
however, whether the California Supreme Court eventually will favor a
231. Id. at 768, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
232. Id. at 768, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
233. Marcarelli,58 Cal. App. 3d at 53, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
234. Anthony, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 769, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 764 (quoting Marcarelli v. Cabell,
58 Cal. App. 3d 51, 53, 129 Cal. Rptr. 509, 510 (1976)).
235. Id. at 771-72, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (quoting Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68
F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (footnote omitted)).
236. Anthony, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
237. The exception is, of course, La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864,
489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). See supra notes 172-99. It has been suggested,
however, that the holding of La Sala was essentially result-oriented. While the lower courts
have followed La Sala's requirement of court approval whenever a class action dismissal is
proposed, the "notice prong" has not been followed, suggesting that the notice aspect of the
case may be limited to its facts. See supra notes 198-99, 219 and accompanying text.
238. See Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 573, 579,
165 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1980) (while plaintiffs have "no absolute right to dismiss their class ac-
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functional approach to precertification issues, or whether the court will
opt for a mandatory notice requirement in all class actions in which the
representative parties seek to compromise their individual claims prior to
class certification.
I.

A Proposal for California

The federal courts have not reached a solid consensus on the precertification settlement issue. PhiladelphiaElectric239 announced the broad
rule that precertification settlements and dismissals must be accompanied
by notice in order to combat what the court justifiably perceived as an
attempt to auction off the rights of the whole class. Several of the lower
federal courts enlarged this rule and required notice to the putative class,
even in cases in which the contemplated settlements were without prejudice to the absentees. Although these courts have reached the correct
result in some instances, they often have done so for the wrong reasons.
Another line of federal cases has recognized that notice is no panacea for the problem of class action abuse. The prospect of notifying an
unknown and potentially unascertainable class can cripple an inoffensive
settlement. On the other hand, notification of the putative class may be
appropriate when there is a real danger that absentees with genuinely
colorable claims have been lulled into inactivity by the actions of the
class representatives. Consequently, California's approach to the precertification settlement problem should balance the considerable potential
for abuse of the class action device against the need to promote amicable
settlement of disputes whenever possible.
There is authority in California to support a requirement of court
approval whenever a class action settlement is proposed, regardless of the
stage of the proceedings at which such approval is sought.24° Although
federal rule 23(e), the Superior Court Rules, 24 1 and the current version of
California's dismissal statute2 42 address the dismissal of "class actions,"
subsequent decisions-in both California and the federal system-have
construed the term broadly to include actions filed as class actions.243
In the absence of explicit statutory guidance, the California courts
should continue to exercise their supervisory powers in reviewing the
tion[s] without hearing and notice to class members, a trial court should grant or deny the
dismissal motion based upon the purpose to be served, to wit, the protection of the class").
239. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967); see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 204, 234 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
242. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 5810) (West Supp. 1988); see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
243. For California cases that apply the court approval requirement to actions filed as
class actions, see supra notes 204, 234 and accompanying-text.
For federal cases similarly construing federal rule 23(e), see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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fairness and adequacy of proposed class action settlements; such a supervisory role will enable the courts to police abuses of the settlement process. When the proposed settlement is expressly without prejudice to the
putative class, however, the parties should not be required to notify the
absent class members unless the court determines that the absentees are
actually and justifiably relying upon the pending suit as their sole means
of obtaining legal redress. A rigid requirement of notice to putative class
members when the named plaintiffs seek to compromise only their individual claims would discourage settlements in some instances and could
244
generate its own peculiar brand of prefiling abuse.
In the alternative, much of the uncertainty that currently undermines the precertification settlement process could be alleviated if California's recently amended dismissal statute24 5 were amended further to
conform substantially with the recommendations of the A.B.A.'s Special
Committee on Class Action Improvements. 24 6 The amended statute
might read as follows:
No action filed as a class action may be dismissed unless and until the
court approves and orders the dismissal, and notice of the proposed
dismissal may be given to some or all members of the putative class in
such manner as the court directs. No action that has been determined
to be a class action under the provisions of this code may be dismissed
unless and until notice that the court deems adequate has been given to
some or all members of the class and the court orders the dismissal.
Such an approach, whether adopted by judicial fiat or legislative action, would govern the majority of precertification settlement cases and
would furnish litigants with meaningful guidance when they seek
nonadversarial resolution of their disputes and legitimate termination of
their responsibilities to a putative class they no longer wish to represent.
IV.

Conclusion
The discussion of class action settlement issues in California begins
with the La Sala opinion. There, the California Supreme Court held that
absent putative class members must receive notice of proposed class action dismissals if the captioned plaintiffs are to receive settlement benefits
244. See Almond, supra note 5, at 337. Almond, suggests that mandatory "precertifica-

tion notice will provide plaintiffs with a powerful new weapon at the prefiling stage, because
once the class action is filed the notice requirement deprives the defendant of the ability to
settle privately with named plaintiffs." Id. at 314-15 (emphasis in original). And, according to
the authors of the HarvardStudy, "[m]easures designed to protect the interest of class members from sellouts by a class attorney and named plaintiffs may have the undesirable side effect
of encouraging attorneys to attempt to negotiate individual settlements before filing a complaint." Harvard Study, supra note 1, at 1542 n.33 (emphasis added).
245. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 5810) (West Supp. 1988). See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
246. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 161, at 203. For the text of the recommended statute,
see supra text accompanying note 162.
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not made available to the class as a whole. La Sala, however, did not
involve the typical precertification settlement in which the plaintiff and
the defendant, after negotiating a settlement agreement, jointly seek a
court approved dismissal. In La Sala, the defendants unilaterally
granted the named plaintiffs the relief sought in their complaint in an
apparent effort to moot the named plaintiffs' cause of action and render
their continued representation of the class untenable.
Viewed in context, the directive of the La Sala court is not inconsistent with the functional approach to precertification settlements advocated in this Note. In La Sala, notice was ordered to counterbalance the
sharp practice of the defendants. The proposed amendment would permit a trial court to craft an appropriate notice response when confronted
with similar tactics at the precertification stage. Likewise, in the more
typical consensual settlement area, the court would be free to direct that
notice of the proposed settlement be given to some or all members of the
putative class as warranted by the circumstances of the particular case.
In accordance with settled due process principles, all settlement proposals would have to be conveyed to the class following certification.
As the law currently exists, the parties to proposed class action lawsuits cannot ascertain precisely what they are bargaining for when they
sit down at the negotiating table. Statutory recognition of the consequences of certification would furnish a workable standard for litigants
and for courts called upon to monitor the settlement process. By clarifying the current statutory regime, California could assume a leadership
role in the area of class action procedure-the federal courts might well
follow that lead.

